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Background Independence, Diffeomorphism
Invariance, and the Meaning of Coordinates∗
Oliver Pooley
Abstract Diffeomorphism invariance is sometimes taken to be a criterion of back-
ground independence. This claim is commonly accompanied by a second, that the
genuine physical magnitudes (the “observables”) of background-independent theo-
ries and those of background-dependent (non-diffeomorphism-invariant) theories are
essentially different in nature. I argue against both claims. Background-dependent the-
ories can be formulated in a diffeomorphism-invariant manner. This suggests that the
nature of the physical magnitudes of relevantly analogous theories (one background
free, the other background dependent) is essentially the same. The temptation to think
otherwise stems from a misunderstanding of the meaning of spacetime coordinates
in background-dependent theories.
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1 What’s so Special about General Relativity?
According to a familiar and plausible view, the core of Einstein’s general theory of
relativity (GR) is what was, in 1915, a radically new way of understanding gravi-
tation. In pre-relativistic theories, whether Newtonian or specially relativistic, the
structure of spacetime is taken to be fixed, varying neither in time nor from solution
to solution. Gravitational phenomena are assumed to be the result of the action of
gravitational forces, diverting gravitating bodies from the natural motions defined by
this fixed spacetime structure. According to GR, in contrast, freely-falling bodies are
force free; their trajectories are natural motions. Gravity is understood in terms of a
mutable spacetime structure. Bodies act gravitationally on one another by affecting
the curvature of spacetime. “Space acts on matter, telling it how to move. In turn,
matter reacts back on space, telling it how to curve” (Misner et al., 1973, 5). Note
that the first of the claims in the quotation is as true in pre-relativistic theories as it is
in GR, at least according to the substantivalist view, which takes spacetime structure
in such a theory to be an independent element of reality. The novelty of GR lies in
the second claim: spacetime curvature varies, in time (and space) and across models,
and the material content of spacetime affects how it does so.
This sketch of the basic character of GR has two, separable elements. One is
the interpretation of the metric field, 푔푎푏, as intrinsically geometrical: gravitationalphenomena are to be understood in terms of the curvature of spacetime. The second
is the stress on the dynamical nature of the metric field: the fact that it has its own
degrees of freedom and, in particular, that their evolution is affected by matter. While
I believe that both of these are genuine (and novel) features of GR, my focus in this
paper is on the second. Those who reject the emphasis on geometry are likely to
claim that the second element by itself encapsulates the true conceptual revolution
ushered in by GR. Non-dynamical fields, such as the spacetime structures of pre-
relativistic physics, are now standardly labelled background fields (although which
of their features qualifies them for this status is a subtle business, to be explored
in what follows). On the view being considered, the essential novelty of GR is that
such background structures have been excised from physics; GR is the prototypical
background-independent theory2 (as it happens, a prototype yet to be improved upon).
Although this paper is about this notion of background independence, the question
of the geometrical status of the metric field cannot be avoided entirely. In argu-
ing against the interpretation of GR as fundamentally about spacetime geometry,
Anderson writes:
What was not clear in the beginning but by now has been recognised is that one does not need
the “geometrical” hypotheses of the theory, namely, the identification of a metric with the
2 In what follows I focus specifically on the notion of background independence that is connected
to the idea that background structures are non-dynamical fields. In doing so, I am ignoring several
other (not always closely related) definitions of background independence, including those given by
Gryb (2010) (which arises more naturally in the context of Barbour’s 3-space approach to dynamics)
and by Rozali (2009) (which arises naturally in string theory). A more serious omission is lack of
discussion of the definition given by Belot (2011), which is motivated by ideas closely related to the
themes of this paper. I hope to explore these connections on another occasion.
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gravitational field, the assumption of geodesic motion, and the assumption that “ideal” clocks
measure proper time as determined by this metric. Indeed, we know that both of these latter
assumptions follow as approximate results directly from the field equations of the theory
without further assumptions. (Anderson, 1996, 528)
There is at least the suggestion here that GR differs from pre-relativistic theories not
only in lacking non-dynamical, background structures but also in terms of how one of
its structures, the “gravitational field”, acquires geometrical meaning: the appropriate
behaviour of test bodies and clocks can be derived, approximately, in the theory. Does
this feature of GR really distinguish it from special relativity (SR)?
Consider, in particular, a clock’s property of measuring the proper time along
its trajectory. In a footnote, Anderson goes on to explain that “the behaviour of
model clocks and what time they measure can be deduced from the equations of
sources of the gravitational and electromagnetic fields which in turn follow from
the field equations” (Anderson, 1996, 529). But the generally relativistic “equations
of sources of the gravitational and electromagnetic fields” are, on the assumption
of minimal coupling, exactly the same as the equations of motion of an analogue
specially relativistic theory.3 It follows that whatever explanatory modelling one can
perform in GR, by appeal to such equations, to show that some particular material
system acts as a good clock and discloses proper time, is equally an explanation of
the behaviour of the same type of clock in the context of SR. Put differently, it is as
true in SR as it is in GR that the “geometrical” hypothesis linking the behaviour of
ideal clocks to the (in this context) non-dynamical background “metric” field is in
principle dispensable.4
2 Einstein on General Covariance
The previous section’s positive characterisation of GR’s essential difference from its
predecessors goes hand-in-hand with a negative claim: GR does not differ from its
predecessors in virtue of being a generally covariant theory. In particular, the general
3 That it is only in the GR context that material fields merit the label “sources of the gravitational
field” is, of course, irrelevant.
4 In this context it is interesting to consider Fletcher’s proof that the clock hypothesis holds up to
arbitrary accuracy for sufficiently small light clocks (Fletcher, 2013). As is explicit in Fletcher’s
paper, his result is as applicable to accelerating clocks in SR as it is to arbitrarily moving clocks
in GR. Fletcher’s proof assumes only that light travels on null geodesics; it does not make any
assumptions about the fundamental physics, or even (specific) assumptions about the deformation of
the spatial dimensions of the clock. All of this is consistent with one of the morals of the “dynamical
approach to special relativity”, defended in Brown (2005) and Brown and Pooley (2006), that it is
no more of a brute fact in SR than in GR that real rods and clocks, which are more or less complex
solutions of the laws governing their constituents, map out geometrical properties in the way that
they do. What Fletcher’s proof illustrates is that some interesting results are nonetheless obtainable
from minimalist, high-level physical assumptions. (Note that, in contrast to the position taken in
Brown and Pooley (2006), I am here assuming that the structure encoded by the flat metric field
of special relativity corresponds to a primitive element of reality, as was entertained in Brown and
Pooley (2006, 82, fn 22).)
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covariance of GR does not embody a “general principle of relativity” (asserting,
for example, the physical equivalence of observers in arbitrary states of relative
motion). In contrast, the restricted, Lorentz covariance of standard formulations
of specially relativistic physics does embody the (standard) relativity principle. In
Michael Friedman’s words, “the principle of general covariance has no physical
content whatever: it specifies no particular physical theory; rather it merely expresses
our commitment to a certain style of formulating physical theories” (Friedman, 1983,
55).
Notoriously, of course, Einstein thought otherwise, at least initially.5 The restricted
relativity principle of SR and Galilean-covariant Newtonian theories is the claim that
the members of a special class of frames of reference, each in uniform translatory
motion relative to the others, are physically equivalent. In such theories, although no
empirical meaning can be given to the idea of absolute rest, there is a fundamental
distinction between accelerated and unaccelerated motion. Einstein thought this was
problematic, and offered a thought experiment to indicate why.
Consider two fluid bodies, separated by a vast distance, rotating relative to one
another about the line joining their centres. Such relative motion is in principle
observable, and so far our description of the set up is symmetric with respect to
the two bodies. Now, however, imagine that one body is perfectly spherical while
the other is oblate. A theory satisfying only the restricted principle of relativity is
compatible with this kind of situation. In such a theory, the second body might be
flattened along the line joining the two bodies only because that body is rotating,
not just with respect to other observable bodies, but with respect to the theory’s
privileged, non-accelerating frames of reference. Einstein deemed this an inadequate
explanation. He claimed that appeal to the body’s motion with respect to the invisible
inertial frames was an appeal to a “merely factitious cause.” In Einstein’s view, a
truly satisfactory explanation should cite “observable facts of experience” (Einstein,
1916, 113). A theory which in turn explains the (local) inertial frames in terms of the
configuration of (observable) distant masses—that is, a theory satisfying (a version
of) Mach’s Principle—would meet such a requirement.
In his quest for a relativistic theory of gravity, Einstein did not attempt to implement
(this version of) Mach’s principle directly. Instead he believed that the equivalence
principle (as he understood it) was the key to extending the relativity principle to cover
frames uniformly accelerating with respect to the inertial frames. In standard SR,
force-free bodies that move uniformly in an inertial frame 퐹 are equally accelerated by
inertial “pseudo forces” relative to a frame 퐹 ′ that is uniformly accelerating relative
to 퐹 . According to Einstein’s equivalence principle, the physics of frame 퐹 ′ is strictly
identical to that of a “real” inertial frame in which there is a uniform gravitational
field. In other words, the same laws of physics hold in two frames that accelerate with
respect to each other. According to one frame, there is a gravitational field; according
to the other, there is not. The laws that hold with respect to both frames, therefore,
must cover gravitational physics. Einstein took it to follow that there is no fact of
the matter about whether a body is moving uniformly or whether it is accelerating
5 The evolution of Einstein’s views is covered in detail by Norton (1993, §3). In this section I largely
follow Norton’s narrative.
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under the influence of gravitation. The existence of a gravitational field becomes
frame-relative, in a manner allegedly analogous to the frame-relativity of particular
electric and magnetic fields in special relativity.6
The equivalence principle, then, led Einstein to believe both that relativistic laws
covering gravitational phenomena would extend the relativity principle and that the
gravitational field would depend, in a frame-relative manner, on the metric field, 푔푎푏.A theory implementing a general principle of relativity would affirm the physical
equivalence of frames of reference in arbitrary relative motion. Einstein took the
physical equivalence of two frames to be captured by the fact that the equations
expressing the laws of physics take the same form with respect to each of them.7
But general covariance is the property that a theory possesses if its equations retain
their form under smooth but otherwise arbitrary coordinate transformation. Einstein
noted that such coordinate transformations strictly include “those which correspond
to all relative motions of three-dimensional systems of co-ordinates” (Einstein, 1916,
117). He therefore maintained that any generally covariant theory satisfies a general
postulate of relativity.8
Einstein soon modified his view. Essentially the view expressed by Friedman
in the quotation given above—that any theory can be given a generally covariant
formulation—was put to Einstein by Kretschmann (1917).9 In his response, Einstein
conceded the basic point (Einstein, 1918). He identified three principles as at the
heart of GR: (a) the (general) principle of relativity; (b) the equivalence principle;
and (c) Mach’s principle. The relativity principle, at least as characterised in his reply
to Kretschmann, was no longer conceived of in terms of the physical equivalence
of frames of reference in various types of relative motion. Instead it had simply
become the claim that the laws of nature are statements only about spatiotemporal
coincidences, from which it was alleged to be an immediate corollary that such laws
“find their natural expression” in generally covariant equations. Mach’s principle was
also given a GR-specific rendition: the claim was that the metric was completely
determined by the masses of bodies.
In another couple of years, as a result of findings by de Sitter and Klein, Einstein
was also forced to accept that his theory did not vindicateMach’s ideas about the origin
of inertia. His official objection to the spacetime structures of Newtonian and specially
6 For a recent, sympathetic discussion of this aspect of Einstein’s understanding of the equivalence
principle, see Janssen (2012).
7 Recall Einstein’s 1905 statement of the restricted principle of relativity: “The laws by which the
states of physical systems undergo change are not affected, whether these changes of state be referred
to the one or the other of two systems of co-ordinates in uniform translatory motion” (Einstein, 1905,
41).
8 “Es ist klar, daß eine Physik, welche diesem Postulat [i.e., general covariance] genügt, dem
allgemeinen Relativitätspostulat gerecht wird” (Einstein, 1916, 776).
9 Kretschmann’s position is more subtle than the headline lesson that is standardly taken from it. In
particular, he relied on a key premise, closely analogous to the central premise of Einstein’s ‘point-
coincidence’ response to his own hole argument, that the factual content of a theory is exhausted by
spatiotemporal coincidences between the objects and processes it posits; see Norton (1993, §5.1).
The assumption that the basic objects of a theory must be well defined in the sense of differential
geometry has come to play a similar role in modern renditions of Kretschmann’s claim.
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relativistic theories changed accordingly, in order to fit this new reality.10 Einstein
conceded that taking Newtonian physics at face value involves taking Newton’s
Absolute Space to be “some kind of physical reality” (Einstein, 1924, 15). That it
has to be conceived of as something real is, he says, “a fact that physicists have only
come to understand in recent years” (Einstein, 1924, 16). It is absolute, however,
not merely in the substantivalist sense that it exists absolutely. Now Einstein placed
emphasis on the fact that it is not influenced “either by the configuration of matter, or
by anything else” (Einstein, 1924, 15). This violation of the action–reaction principle,
rather than its status as an unobservable causal agent, came to be seen as what is
objectionable about pre-relativistic spacetime. In Einstein’s words, “it is contrary to
the mode of thinking in science to conceive of a thing (the space-time continuum)
which acts itself, but which cannot be acted upon” (Einstein, 1922, 62).11 It is clear
that, while GR fails to fulfil the Machian goal of providing a reductive account of the
local inertial frames, it does not suffer from this newly identified (alleged) defect of
pre-relativistic theories. The metric structure of GR conditions the evolution of the
material content of spacetime, but it is also, in turn, affected by that content.
This potted review of Einstein’s early pronouncements is intended to show that
he was one of the original advocates of the view outlined in Section 1, namely,
that GR differs from its predecessors, not through lacking the kind of spacetime
structures that such theories have, but by no longer treating that structure as a non-
dynamical background. It also shows that, despite being responsible for the idea
that the general covariance of GR has physical significance as the expression of the
theory’s generalisation of the relativity principle, Einstein himself quickly retreated
from this idea. He continued (mistakenly) to espouse the idea that GR generalised the
principle of relativity, via the equivalence principle, but GR’s general covariance was
no longer taken to be a sufficient condition of its doing so. Instead the implication in
the opposite direction was stressed. General covariance was taken to be a necessary
condition of implementing a general relativity principle: there can be no special
coordinate systems adapted to preferred states of motion in a theory in which there
are no preferred states of motion!
In the immediate wake of Kretschmann’s criticism, one of Einstein’s most revealing
statements concerning the status of general covariance comes in his response to a
paper by Ernst Reichenbächer. There Einstein contrasts a theory that includes an
acceleration standard with one that does not:
if acceleration has absolute meaning, then the nonaccelerated coordinate systems are preferred
by nature, i.e., the laws then must—when referred to them—be different (and simpler) than
the ones referred to accelerated coordinate systems. Then it makes no sense to complicate
the formulation of the laws by pressing them into a generally covariant form.
10 For more on the evolution of this aspect of Einstein’s thinking, see Brown and Lehmkuhl (2013).
11 Similarly, Anderson writes that violation of what he calls a general principle of reciprocity “seems
to be fundamentally unreasonable and unsatisfactory” (Anderson, 1964, 192). As far as I know,
neither he nor Einstein explain why, exactly, such violation is supposed to be objectionable. At the
very least, given Newton’s open-eyed advocacy of absolute space, it seems peculiar to describe it as
“contrary to the mode of scientific thinking.”
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Vice versa, if the laws of nature are such that they do not attain a preferred form through
the choice of coordinate systems of a special state of motion, then one cannot relinquish the
condition of general covariance as a means of research. (Einstein, 1920, 205)
From a modern perspective, several things are notable about this passage. First,
GR qualifies as a theory whose laws do not attain a “preferred form through the
choice of coordinate systems of a special state of motion,” not because (as Einstein
believed) acceleration does not have an absolute meaning in the theory, but because
the structure that defines absolute acceleration is no longer homogeneous; in general,
it is not possible to define, over a neighbourhood of a point in spacetime, a coordinate
system whose lines of constant spatial coordinate are both non-accelerating absolutely
and not accelerating with respect to each other. GR lacks a non-generally-covariant
formulation,12 but not for the reason Einstein suggests.
Second, while the equations expressing a theory’s laws might be simpler in a
coordinate system adapted to the theory’s standard of acceleration, it does not follow
that these equations, and the equations that hold with respect to accelerated coordinate
systems, express different laws. In fact, it is much more natural to see the formally
different equations as but different coordinate-dependent expressions of the same
relations holding between coordinate-independent entities. As Anderson says of enti-
ties that occur explicitly in a generally covariant formulation of some laws but which
were not apparent in the non-(generally)-covariant equations: “these elements were
there in the first place, although their existence was masked by the fact that they had
been assigned particular values. That is, the 푔휇휈 [of a generally covariant formulation
of a special relativity] are present in [the Lorentz-covariant form of] special relativity
with the fixed preassigned values of the Minkowski metric” (Anderson, 1964, 192).13
Finally, while calculation might not be aided by complicating the formulation of
the laws by expressing them generally covariantly, conceptual clarity can be. Real
structures that are only implicit in the non-covariant formalism are laid bare in the
generally-covariant formalism, and their status can then be subjected to scrutiny.
In fact, Einstein himself says something quite consonant with these observations
earlier in the same paper:
the coordinate system is only a means of description and in itself has nothing to do with the
objects to be described. Only a law of nature in a generally covariant form can do complete
justice in this situation, because in any other way of describing, statements about the means
of description are jumbled with statements about the object to be described. (Einstein, 1920,
203)
Einstein’s idea seems to be that coordinates should not have a function beyond the
mere labelling of physical entities, the qualitative character of which is to be fully
12 Even this can be disputed. Fock, for example, argued that harmonic coordinates, defined via the
condition (푔휇휈√−푔),휇 = 0, have a preferred status in GR, analogous to that of Lorentz charts inspecial relativity.
13 The same view of the meaning of the preferred coordinates of the non-covariant form of Newtonian
gravitation theory is clearly articulated by Trautman (1966, 418). It was thoroughly assimilated in
the philosophical literature; see, e.g., Friedman (1983, 54–55). The perspective is explored further
in Sections 4 and 10, where I argue that its relevance for discussions of alleged differences between
the observables of GR and pre-relativistic theories has not been fully appreciated.
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described by other means. But this is a basis, not for an argument in favour of laws
that can only be expressed generally covariantly (seemingly Einstein’s intention), but
for an argument for the generally-covariant formulation of laws in general, whatever
they be. Ironically, it is an argument that is most relevant to pre-relativistic theories,
not GR, because only in this context can one choose to encode physically meaningful
quantities (spacetime intervals) via special choices of coordinate system, and thereby
‘jumble up’ the mode of description with that described.
3 Dissent from Quantum Gravity
Let me sum up the picture presented so far. General covariance per se has no physical
content: the essence of Kretschmann’s objection to Einstein is that any sensible theory
can be formulated in a generally covariant manner. It follows that GR does not differ
from SR in virtue of having a generally covariant formulation. However, GR does
differ from SR in lacking a non-covariant formulation. Some authors have made
this fact the basis for claiming that GR, but not SR, satisfies a “principle of general
covariance”. For example, Bergmann writes: “The hypothesis that the geometry of
physical space is represented best by a formalism which is covariant with respect to
general coordinate transformations, and that a restriction to a less general group of
transformations would not simplify that formalism, is called the principle of general
covariance” (Bergmann, 1942, 159).
In SR the existence of a non-covariant formulation is connected with the failure of
a general principle of relativity. The privileged coordinate systems of SR, in which
the equations expressing the laws simplify, encode (inter alia) a standard of non-
accelerated motion. There can be no preferred coordinate systems (of such a type)
in a theory that implements a general principle of relativity. This might suggest that
GR’s lack of a non-covariant formulation is connected to the generalisation of a
relativity principle, but (pace Einstein) it stems from no such thing. Rather, the lack
of preferred coordinates is due to the fact that the spacetime structures of a generic
solution, including those structures common to SR and GR that define absolute
acceleration (in essentially the same way in both theories), lack symmetries and so
cannot be encoded in special coordinates.
Finally, this lack of symmetry is entailed by, but does not entail, the fundamental
distinguishing feature of GR, namely, that the structure encoded by the metric of GR
is, unlike that of SR, dynamical. A fully dynamical field, free to vary from solution
to solution, will generically lack symmetries. So a background independent theory, in
which all fields are dynamical, will lack a non-covariant formulation (of the relevant
kind). The converse, however, is not true. In principle we can define a theory involving
a background metric with no isometries, and such a theory will only have a generally
covariant formulation.14
14 Smolin demurs: “if one believes that the geometry of space is going to have an absolute character,
fixed in advance, by some a priori principles, you are going to be led to posit a homogeneous
geometry. For what, other than particular states of matter, would be responsible for inhomogeneities
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Something like this collection of commitments, though not uncontroversial, repre-
sents a mainstream view, at least amongst more recent textbooks in the tradition of
Synge (1960) and Misner et al. (1973). Unfortunately, there is a fly in the ointment,
for it apparently conflicts with a dominant view amongst many in the quantum gravity
community, in particular, the founding fathers of loop quantum gravity. Workers in
this field often endorse the idea that GR’s background independence, understood
as the absence of ‘fixed’, non-dynamical spacetime structure, is its defining feature.
But they go on to link this property to the theory’s general covariance, or, to use the
more favoured label, its diffeomorphism invariance. For example, Lee Smolin claims
that “both philosophically and mathematically, it is diffeomorphism invariance that
distinguishes general relativity from other field theories” (Smolin, 2003, 234).
And Carlo Rovelli, who has perhaps written the most on the link between back-
ground independence and diffeomorphism invariance, says of the background inde-
pendence of classical GR that “technically, it is realized by the gauge invariance of
the action under (active) diffeomorphisms” (Rovelli, 2004, 10), and (perhaps in less
careful moments) he treats the two as synonymous (Gaul and Rovelli, 2000, 279).
On the face of it, these claims conflict with the Kretschmann view. They appear to
assert that a formal property of GR, its “(active) diffeomorphism invariance”, has
physical content in virtue of realising, or expressing, a physical property of the theory,
namely, its background independence. Since specially relativistic theories are not
background independent (as we have been understanding this term), it should follow
that they cannot be formulated in a diffeomorphism invariant manner. At the very
least, if one follows Kretschmann in supposing that any theory can be formulated in a
generally covariant manner, then (active) diffeomorphism invariance, as understood
by Rovelli et al., cannot be the same as general covariance as understood in the
Kretschmann tradition. And, indeed, the same authors routinely draw distinctions of
this kind.
Much of the rest of this paper is concerned to see how far one can push back against
the Rovelli–Smolin line, in the spirit of Kretschmann and Friedman.What the exercise
reveals is that the connection between diffeomorphism invariance and background
independence is messier, and less illuminating, than recent discussions originating
in the quantum gravity literature might suggest. It also sheds light on a different but
closely related topic. In the same discussions, the diffeomorphism invariance and/or
background independence of GR is frequently taken to have profound implications
for the nature of the theory’s observables. It is important that a merely technical
sense of “observable” is not all that is at issue. The claim often appears to be that GR
and pre-relativistic theories differ in terms of the kind of thing that is observable in
a non-technical sense. In other words, it is alleged that the theories differ over the
fundamental nature of the physical magnitudes that they postulate.15 This, I believe,
is a mistake, as I hope some of the distinctions to be reviewed below help to show.
in the geometry of space?” (Smolin, 2006, 201). But why does a background geometry need to
be fixed by “a priori principles”? Its being what it is could simply be brute fact, inhomogeneities
notwithstanding.
15 Amongst philosophers, Earman (2006a) and Rickles (2008) are proponents of variants of this
view.
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The first task is to clarify what might be meant by “diffeomorphism invariance”
as distinct from “general covariance”. I then revisit the notion of a background field,
as characterised informally above, for finer-grained distinctions should be drawn here
too.
4 General Covariance vs Diffeomorphism Invariance
Several authors have drawn what they presumably take to be the crucial, bipartite
distinction between types of general covariance and diffeomorphism invariance. Nor-
ton, for example, distinguishes “active” and “passive” general covariance (Norton,
1989, 1226, 1230). Rovelli distinguishes “active diff invariance” from “passive diff
invariance” (Rovelli, 2001, 122). Earman distinguishes merely “formal” from “sub-
stantive” general covariance (Earman, 2006b,a). Ohanian and Ruffini distinguish
“general covariance” from “general invariance” (Ohanian and Ruffini, 2013, 276–9).
Finally, Giulini distinguishes “covariance under diffeomorphisms” from “invariance
under diffeomorphisms” (Giulini, 2007, 108). As this cornucopia of terminology
indicates, several different distinctions are in play, and linked to further ancillary
notions (for example, that between “active” and “passive” transformations) in myriad
ways. In the face of this morass, my strategy will be to articulate as clearly as I can
what I take to be the most useful distinction, before relating it to several of the ideas
just listed.
In differentiating distinct notions of general covariance and diffeomorphism in-
variance, it will be useful to consider various concrete formulations of theories that
exemplify the properties in question. Further, when contrasting specially and gener-
ally relativistic theories, it is good policy to eliminate unnecessary and potentially
misleading differences by choosing theories that are as similar as possible. My run-
ning example, for both the specially and generally relativistic cases, will be theories
of a relativistic massless real scalar field, Φ.
In the context of SR, such a field obeys the Klein–Gordon equation, but there are
at least three “versions” of this equation to consider:
휕2Φ
휕푥2
+ 휕
2Φ
휕푦2
+ 휕
2Φ
휕푧2
− 휕
2Φ
휕푡2
= 0, (1)
휂휇휈Φ;휈휇 = 0, (2)
휂푎푏∇푎∇푏Φ = 0. (3)
These equations are most plausibly understood as (elements of) different formulations
of one and the same theory, not as characterising different theories. This requires that
the equations are understood as but different ways of picking out the very same set of
models (and thereby the very same set of physical possibilities). On the picture that
allows this, one also gains a better understanding of the content of each equation.
What is that picture? Start with equation (3). The roman indices occurring in
the equation are “abstract indices”, indicating the type of geometric object involved.
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This equation, therefore, is not to be interpreted (as the other two are) as relating
the coordinate components of various objects. Rather, it is a direct description of
(the relations holding between) certain geometric object fields defined on a differen-
tiable manifold. Its models are triples of the form ⟨푀, 휂푎푏,Φ⟩: differential manifoldsequipped with a (flat) Lorentzian metric field 휂푎푏 and a single scalar field Φ. (I amtaking the torsion-free, metric-compatible derivative operator, ∇, to be defined in
terms of the metric field; it is not another primitive object, over and above 휂푎푏 andΦ.)Equations (1) and (2) are to be understood as ways of characterising the very same
models, but now given under certain types of coordinate description. In particular,
in the case of equation (1), one is choosing coordinates that are specially adapted to
symmetries of one of the fields of the model, namely, the flat Minkowski metric. Such
coordinates are singled out via the “coordinate condition” 휂휇휈 = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1).In the case of equation (2), one is allowing any coordinate system adapted to the
differential structure of the manifold,푀 .
We are now in a position to draw the crucial distinction between general covariance
(as it has been implicitly understood in the previous sections) and diffeomorphism
invariance for, on one natural way of further filling in the details, although it is
generally covariant, the theory just given fails to be diffeomorphism invariant.
First, general covariance. We define this as follows:
General Covariance. A formulation of a theory is generally covariant iff the equa-
tions expressing its laws are written in a form that holds with respect to all members
of a set of coordinate systems that are related by smooth but otherwise arbitrary
transformations.
It is clear that such a formulation is possible for our theory. It is what is achieved
in the passage from the traditional form of the equation, (1), to equation (2). General
covariance in this sense is sometimes taken to be equivalent to the claim that the
laws have a coordinate-free formulation (Friedman, 1983, 54; Giulini, 2007, 108).
This takes us to equation (3): if the laws relate geometric objects of types that are
intrinsically characterisable, without recourse to how their components transforma-
tions under changes of coordinates, then one should be able, with the introduction of
the right notation, to describe the relationships between them directly, rather than in
terms of relationships that hold between the objects’ coordinate components.
In order to address the question of the theory’s diffeomorphism invariance, one
needs to be more explicit than we have so far been about how one should understand
equation (3). In particular, what, exactly, is the referent of the ‘휂푎푏’ that occurs inthis equation? Here is one very natural way to set things up. It is a picture that lies
behind the claim of several authors that, while specially relativistic theories can
be made generally covariant in the sense just described, they are nevertheless not
diffeomorphism invariant.
Take the kinematically possible models (KPMs) of the theory to be suitably smooth
functions from some given manifold equipped with a Minkowski metric, ⟨푀, 휂푎푏⟩into ℝ. That is, they are objects of the form ⟨푀, 휂푎푏,Φ⟩, where 휂푎푏 is held fixed—it
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is identically the same in every model.16 The dynamically possible models (DPMs)
are then the proper subset of these objects picked out by the requirement that Φ
satisfies the Klein–Gordon equation relative to the 휂푎푏 common to all the KPMs. Sounderstood, equation (3) is not an equation for 휂푎푏 and Φ together. Rather, it is anequation for Φ alone, given 휂푎푏 (cf. Giulini, 2007, 107). For ease of future reference,call this version of the specially relativistic theory of the scalar field SR1.
Our initial definition of diffeomorphism invariance runs as follows:
Diffeomorphism Invariance (version 1). A theory 푇 is diffeomorphism invariant
iff, if ⟨푀,푂1, 푂2,…⟩ is a solution of 푇 , then so is ⟨푀,푑∗푂1, 푑∗푂2,…⟩ for all
푑 ∈ Diff(푀).17
So defined, diffeomorphism invariance corresponds to what has sometimes sim-
ply been identified as general covariance in the post-Hole Argument philosophical
literature.18 Friedman is explicit in taking general covariance as defined above (cf.
Friedman, 1983, 51) to be equivalent to diffeomorphism invariance as just defined
(cf. Friedman, 1983, 58). In arguing for this equivalence (Friedman, 1983, 52–4),
he appears to overlook the crucial possibility, exploited here, that a coordinate-free
equation relating two geometric objects 퐴 and 퐵, can nonetheless be interpreted as
an equation for 퐵 alone, given a fixed 퐴. (We shall see in Section 9 that Earman
(2006b) seems to be guilty of a similar oversight.)
Returning to SR1, it is clear that, with the KPMs and DPMs defined as suggested,
the theory does not satisfy the definition of diffeomorphism invariance just given.
If ⟨푀, 휂푎푏,Φ⟩ is a model of the theory, ⟨푀,푑∗휂푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩ will be a model only if
푑∗휂푎푏 = 휂푎푏, for only in that case will ⟨푀,푑∗휂푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩ correspond to a KPM, letalone a DPM!
Contrast SR1 to the generally relativistic theory of the scalar field. To make the
analogy as close as possible, consider the sector of the theory defined on the same
manifold푀 mentioned in SR1. Call this theory GR1. Superficially, the KPMs and
the DPMs of GR1 are the same type of objects as those of SR1: triples of the form⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩, where 푔푎푏, like 휂푎푏, is a Lorentzian metric field. But now one does nothave the option of taking 푔푎푏 to be fixed.19 Rather the KPMs of the theory are all
16 This means that the concept of a fixed field is not equivalent to the concept of an absolute object
in the Anderson–Friedman sense. In using “fixed” in this quasi-technical sense, I follow Belot (see,
e.g., 2007, 197, fn 137). The distinction is explored more fully in Section 7.
17 In this statement of the condition, 푂푖 and 푑∗푂푖 are distinct mathematical objects; one is notcontrasting different coordinate representations of the very same objects.
18 See, e.g., Earman (1989, 47). As mentioned, Norton distinguishes active and passive general
covariance. His statement of the former (Norton, 1989, 1226) is almost identical to the statement
of diffeomorphism invariance just given, save that he considers diffeomorphisms between distinct
manifolds. (His statement of passive general covariance (Norton, 1989, 1230) differs, however, from
the characterisation of general covariance given above, in focusing on the closure properties of the
set of coordinate representations of a theory’s models, rather than on the nature of the equations that
pick out such models.)
19 Strictly speaking, one could interpret equations (4) and (5), given below, as describing a theory of
a single field Φ propagating on a fixed 푔푎푏. The resulting space of DPMs would consist of a singlepoint in this cut-down space of KPMs! What, exactly, would be wrong with such a setup? We take
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possible triples of the form ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩, subject only to 푔푎푏 and Φ satisfying suitabledifferentiability (and perhaps boundary) conditions. The DPMs are picked out as a
proper subset of the KPMs by two equations:
푔푎푏∇푎∇푏Φ = 0, (4)
퐺푎푏 = 8휋푇푎푏. (5)
Equation (5) is the Einstein field equation, relating the Einstein tensor 퐺푎푏, en-coding certain curvature properties of 푔푎푏, to the energy momentum tensor 푇푎푏.20Equation (4) might look superficially like equation (3), but now it is no longer an
equation for Φ given 푔푎푏. Rather (4) and (5) together form a coupled system ofequations—the “Einstein–Klein–Gordon equations”—for 푔푎푏 and Φ together. Thisgenerally relativistic theory is, of course, diffeomorphism invariant: if ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩satisfies equations (4) and (5), so does ⟨푀,푑∗푔푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩ for any diffeomorphism 푑.The rather dramatic way in which SR1 fails to meet our definition of diffeomor-
phism invariance—that for a generic diffeomorphism 푑, ⟨푀,푑∗휂푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩ is noteven a KPM when ⟨푀, 휂푎푏,Φ⟩ is a DPM—suggests a modification of our defini-tion. Rather than considering the effect of a diffeomorphism on all of the fields of
a theory’s models, we can exploit the distinction, built into the very construction
of the theory, between fixed fields and dynamical fields. Letting 퐹 stand for the
solution-independent fixed fields common to all KPMs, and letting 퐷 stand for the
dynamical fields, we can consider the effect of acting only on the latter. This leads to
the following amended definition:
Diffeomorphism Invariance (final version). A theory 푇 is diffeomorphism invari-
ant iff, if ⟨푀,퐹 ,퐷⟩ is a solution of 푇 , then so is ⟨푀,퐹 , 푑∗퐷⟩ for all 푑 ∈ Diff(푀).
More generally, one can say that a theory 푇 is 퐺-invariant, for some subgroup
퐺 ⊆ Diff(푀) iff, if ⟨푀,퐹 ,퐷⟩ is a solution of 푇 , then so is ⟨푀,퐹 , 푔∗퐷…⟩ for all
푔 ∈ 퐺.
Since GR1 involves no fixed fields, acting only on the dynamical fields just is to
act on all the fields. Our amendment to the definition of diffeomorphism invariance
therefore makes no material difference in this case. For this reason, focus on theories
like GR1 tends to obscure the difference between our two definitions. Turning to
the case of SR1, this theory still fails to be diffeomorphism invariant under the new
definition: for an arbitrary diffeomorphism 푑, if ⟨푀, 휂푎푏,Φ⟩ is a solution of SR1, then⟨푀, 휂푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩, in general, will not be. However, assuming no boundary conditionsare being imposed, ⟨푀, 휂푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩ will nonetheless be a KPM of the theory. Thisbecomes significant when considering the definition of the invariance of the theory
under proper subgroups of Diff(푀).
Suppose 푇 has models of the form ⟨푀,퐹 ,퐷⟩ and that 푑 is a symmetry of the fixed,
background structure, i.e., 푑∗퐹 = 퐹 . In this case, ⟨푀,푑∗퐹 , 푑∗퐷⟩ = ⟨푀,퐹 , 푑∗퐷⟩
ourselves to have evidence for the (approximate) truth of our theory (GR) even though we have not
pinned down a specific model. But on this variant of the theory, pinning down the theory requires
pinning down a unique model.
20 For our massless real scalar field, 푇푎푏 = (∇푎Φ)(∇푏Φ) − 12푔푎푏푔푚푛(∇푚Φ)(∇푛Φ).
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and so, for this subgroup of Diff(푀), an invariance principle that asks us to consider
transformations of all fields, background and dynamical, will give the same verdict
as those that consider transformations only of the dynamical fields. Further, it fol-
lows from the general covariance of the theory, i.e., from the fact that its defining
equation can be give a coordinate-free expression, that when 푑 is a symmetry of 퐹 ,⟨푀,푑∗퐹 , 푑∗퐷⟩ = ⟨푀,퐹 , 푑∗퐷⟩ will be a DPM whenever ⟨푀,퐹 ,퐷⟩ is.21 We can
therefore define 퐺-invariance either by analogy with the first definition of diffeomor-
phism invariance or (as advocated) by analogy with the final version, and we will get
the verdict that if 퐺 is a subgroup of the automorphism group of 퐹 , then the theory
is 퐺-invariant.
The definitions give different verdicts, however, when we consider the opposite
implication: if 푇 is a 퐺-invariant theory, does it follow that 퐺 is a subgroup of the
automorphism group of its fixed fields 퐹 ? If 퐺-invariance requires that if ⟨푀,퐹 ,퐷⟩
is a DPM then so is ⟨푀,푔∗퐹 , 푔∗퐷…⟩, for all 푔 ∈ 퐺, then no diffeomorphism that is
not also an automorphism of 퐹 could be a member of퐺. Such a diffeomorphism does
not map KPMs to KPMs. However, if 퐺-invariance only requires that if ⟨푀,퐹 ,퐷⟩
is a DPM then so is ⟨푀,퐹 , 푔∗퐷…⟩, then the automorphisms of 퐹 can be a proper
subgroup of퐺. In fact, this is exactly the situation in the case of SR1. Let 푑 correspond
to a conformal transformation of 휂푎푏. Since we are considering the massless Klein–Gordon field, if ⟨푀, 휂푎푏,Φ⟩ is a DPM, then so is ⟨푀, 휂푎푏, 푑∗Φ⟩, even though 푑∗휂푎푏 ≠
휂푎푏. We can only capture this fact in terms of the statement that the theory is invariantunder the relevant group if we define such invariance in the modified manner.22
Let’s take a step back and recall the wider project. We are interested in assessing
the claim that diffeomorphism invariance is intimately linked to background indepen-
dence. I contend that the distinction drawn in this section between general covariance
and diffeomorphism invariance, and exemplified by SR1’s satisfaction of the first but
not the second, is the right one for this purpose, for it makes good sense of several
remarks by the claim’s defenders.
For example, Smolin (2003, §6) offers an extended discussion of diffeomorphism
invariance and its connection to background independence. His focus is on the inter-
pretational consequences of diffeomorphism invariance, rather than on providing a
positive characterisation of the property as such, so no direct comparison with the
definition proposed here can be made. (He is also particularly concerned to stress
the gauge status of diffeomorphisms in the context of a diffeomorphism-invariant
formulation of a theory, a topic I return to in Section 9.) However, his contrasting
21 Note that this claim is not identical to Earman’s claim that it follows from general covariance
that a diffeomorphism that is symmetry of a theory’s spacetime structure will also be what he calls
a “dynamical symmetry” (Earman, 1989, 46–7). The reason is that Earman’s “general covariance”
corresponds to the (unmodified) definition of diffeomorphism invariance given above.
22 Similar, historically-inspired examples are Galilean-invariant classical mechanics set in full New-
tonian spacetime and, more interestingly, Newtonian gravitational theory set in Galilean spacetime
(see, e.g., Knox, 2014). What these examples should remind one is that such theories are epistemo-
logically problematic. The background structure that they postulate introduces allegedly meaningful
properties (e.g., absolute velocities) that are undetectable in principle. This motivates the search for
formulations with weaker background structure (see, e.g. Pooley, 2013, §3 and §6).
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diffeomorphism invariance with general coordinate invariance is fully consonant with
the distinction of this section:
it can be asserted—indeed it is true—that with the introduction of explicit background fields
any field theory can be written in a way that is generally coordinate invariant. This is not true
of diffeomorphisms [sic] invariance, which relies on the fact that in general relativity there
are no non-dynamical background fields. (Smolin, 2003, 233)
It is natural to read the second half of this passage as committing Smolin to the claim
that SR1 cannot be made diffeomorphism invariant because the theory involves a
non-dynamical background, 휂푎푏.Consider, now, a revealing passage from Rovelli. Having summarised what he
takes to be the philosophical implications of GR’s lack of non-dynamical background
structures, he states that these implications are “coded in the active diffeomorphism
invariance (diff invariance) of GR” (Rovelli, 2001, 108). He goes on to elaborate in a
footnote:
Active diff invariance should not be confused with passive diff invariance, or invariance under
change of co-ordinates. . .A field theory is formulated in [a] manner invariant under passive
diffs (or change of co-ordinates), if we can change the co-ordinates of the manifold, re-express
all the geometric quantities (dynamical and non-dynamical) in the new coordinates, and the
form of the equations of motion does not change. A theory is invariant under active diffs,
when a smooth displacement of the dynamical fields (the dynamical fields alone) over the
manifold, sends solutions of the equations of motion into solutions of the equations of motion.
(Rovelli, 2001, 122)
I take it that SR1 is precisely a theory formulated in a manner invariant under passive
diffs, but not active diffs, whereas GR1 is a theory invariant under active diffs. In
other words, Rovelli’s “passive diffeomorphism invariance” is what I called above
general covariance. Identifying Rovelli’s “non-dynamical” fields with fixed fields,
his “active diffeomorphism invariance” corresponds to our (amended) definition of
diffeomorphism invariance.
Finally, Giulini (2007) offers equivalent definitions, although he adopts a rather
different approach to characterising general covariance. He schematically represents
a theory’s equations of motion as:
 [훾,Φ,Σ] = 0 (6)
Here 훾 goes proxy for structures given by maps into the manifold푀 (representing
particle worldlines, strings etc.) andΦ goes proxy for the dynamical fields: maps from
spacetime into some value space (or, more generally, structures given by sections in
some bundle over푀). Finally, Σ stands for the fixed (“background”) structures.23
He then distinguishes what he calls the notion of covariance from invariance as
follows (see Giulini, 2007, 108). Equation (6) is said to be covariant under diffeo-
morphisms iff:
 [훾,Φ,Σ] = 0 iff  [푑 ⋅ 훾, 푑 ⋅Φ, 푑 ⋅ Σ] = 0 ∀푑 ∈ Diff(푀). (7)
23 In both our examples theories, 훾 is empty and the scalar field Φ belongs to Giulini’s category Φ.
In the case of SR1, 휂푎푏 belongs to Σ; in GR1, 푔푎푏 belongs to (Giulini’s) Φ, and Σ is empty.
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It is invariant under diffeomorphisms iff:
 [훾,Φ,Σ] = 0 iff  [푑 ⋅ 훾, 푑 ⋅Φ,Σ] = 0 ∀푑 ∈ Diff(푀). (8)
The only difference between these conditions is that in the former but not in the latter
case one allows the diffeomorphism to act on the fixed fields. In absence of fixed
fields, therefore, the distinction between the conditions collapses: covariance implies
invariance.
The distinction between the 훾 and Φ, on the one hand, and the Σ on the other is
crucial in understanding these conditions. Consider, first, condition (8). The statement
that  [훾,Φ,Σ] = 0 iff  [푑 ⋅훾, 푑 ⋅Φ,Σ] = 0 simply means that ⟨훾,Φ⟩ and ⟨푑 ⋅훾, 푑 ⋅Φ⟩
stand or fall together as solutions of (6). The condition is therefore this section’s
(modified) statement of diffeomorphism invariance.
Now consider condition (7). The fact that  [훾,Φ,Σ] = 0 is only an equation for 훾
andΦ (but not Σ) means that  [훾,Φ,Σ] = 0 and  [푑 ⋅ 훾, 푑 ⋅Φ, 푑 ⋅Σ] = 0 are distinct
equations. The condition states that if ⟨훾,Φ⟩ is a solution to (6), then ⟨푑 ⋅ 훾, 푑 ⋅Φ⟩
must be a solution of a structurally similar equation involving the different field(s)
푑 ⋅Σ. The condition (7), therefore, says nothing about whether 푑 maps a solution of (6)
to another solution of the same equation. Given that Σ represents fixed fields, (7) does
not collapse into our original, unmodified statement of diffeomorphism invariance.
All that it requires is that (6) be well defined in the differential-geometric sense. It is
therefore equivalent to the requirement that the equation have a generally covariant
expression in the sense given earlier.
5 Diffeomorphism-Invariant Special Relativity
The previous section described a generally-covariant but non-diffeomorphism-
invariant formulation of an intuitively background-dependent theory, SR1. This
was contrasted with a generally-covariant and diffeomorphism-invariant formulation
of an intuitively background-independent theory, GR1.24 What should one make of
SR1’s failure to be diffeomorphism invariant? Does it support Smolin’s contention
that diffeomorphism invariance “relies on” the absence of background fields? In this
section and the next, I suggest that it does not. At the very least, whether it does
depends on what counts as a “background field.”
We need to consider yet another formulation of a theory, which I’ll call SR2. This
theory’s space of KPMs is the very same set of objects that formed the space of KPMs
of the generally-relativistic GR1. But, rather than being picked out via equations (4)
and (5), the subspace of DPMs is defined via:
24 From here on, when I refer simply to “diffeomorphism invariance” I am referring to the property
captured by the second (final) definition given in the previous section. The merits, or otherwise, of
the first definition will not be discussed further.
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푔푎푏∇푎∇푏Φ = 0, (4)
푅푎푏푐푑 = 0, (9)
where 푅푎푏푐푑 is the Riemann curvature tensor of 푔푎푏.25 Several comments are in orderbefore we assess the interpretational dilemmas that SR2 presents.
First, the contrast between SR1 and SR2 highlights something of a contrast be-
tween the philosophy literature, including the post-Hole Argument literature, and dis-
cussions of background independence arising from attempts to quantise GR. Crudely
put, philosophers have tended to have a formulation of a theory like SR2 in mind
when they have considered ‘generally covariant’ formulations of special relativity
(see, e.g., Earman and Norton, 1987, 518), whereas physicists have tended to have
something like SR1 in mind. This is not unrelated to the fact, noted in the previous
section, that Friedman, Earman, and even Norton (used to) identify (active) general
covariance with diffeomorphism invariance (as initially characterised in the previous
section).
This is not to say that the physics literature has not discussed theories like SR2—we
shall shortly see that it has—but it is possible to mistake a discussion of an SR1-type
theory for that of a SR2-type theory. One does not arrive at SR2 simply by stipulating
that equation (9) is to be satisfied. One must also indicate how 푔푎푏, as it occurs in(4) and (9), is to be interpreted. After all, the field 휂푎푏 of SR1 satisfies a formallyidentical equation to (9). It is just that, in this context, the equation does not function
to pick out a class of DPMs from a wider class of KPMs. Instead it characterises a
fixed field common to all the KPMs. In SR2, it is important that (4) and (9), just like
(4) and (5) in GR1, are understood as coupled equations for both Φ and 푔푎푏.Finally, of course, we should note the crucial fact that SR2, like GR1 and unlike
SR1, is diffeomorphism invariant.
6 Connecting Diffeomorphism Invariance and Background
Independence
What does the the diffeomorphism invariance of SR2 tell us about the alleged link
between diffeomorphism invariance and background independence? A proper answer
to this question will require disentangling various meanings of “background”, but here
is the obvious moral: SR2 is a diffeomorphism-invariant but intuitively background-
dependent theory. Diffeomorphism invariance therefore cannot be equated with—or
be seen as a formal expression of, or sufficient condition for—background inde-
pendence. Diffeomorphism invariance is not, per se, what differentiates GR from
pre-relativistic theories.
25 As with those of GR1, the theory’s KPMs are restricted to fields defined on a given manifold푀 .
In the previous section, this restriction served to allow as direct as possible a comparison between
GR1 and SR1. When comparison with SR1 is not at issue, the restriction is arbitrary. One can (and
should) generalise the formulations of SR2 and GR1 further, not least to allow for different global
topologies.
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Here is one way that this conclusion might be resisted. Consider the following
questions. (Q1) Is SR2 a background-independent theory? (Q2) Are SR1 and SR2
merely different ways of formulating the same theory? Suppose that one answers
(Q1) in the affirmative, on the grounds that 푔푎푏 in a model of the theory is a solution
to an equation. It therefore counts as a ‘dynamical field’; it is not ‘fixed a priori’. This,
in effect, is to treat ‘background field’ as synonymous with ‘solution-independent
fixed field’ in the sense highlighted in Section 4. One then goes on to answer question
(Q2) in the negative. Precursors of GR were not background independent, period,
and so only SR1 is faithful to the pre-GR understanding of the spacetime structure of
special relativity.
I take it that this package is a highly implausible cocktail of views. First, one
should ask: on what basis can one assert that SR1 and SR2 constitute genuinely
distinct theories, rather than merely different formulations of the same theory? On
the face of it, since their models involve the same types of geometric object, and
since all objects in any solution of one theory are diffeomorphic to the corresponding
objects in some solution of the other, the two formulations appear to be, not merely
empirically equivalent, but equivalent in a thoroughgoing sense. The DPMs of one
theory are isomorphic to the DPMs of the other; it is just that, for each solution of
one of the theories, the other theory has an infinite set of diffeomorphic copies.
Second, the classification of SR2 as relevantly similar toGR1, and so background
independent, focuses on a minor similarity between the theories at the expense of
a more significant contrast. True, the 푔푎푏s of both theories are treated as ‘solutionsof equations’ and in this sense they are not fixed, but this fact seems much less
interesting than their obvious differences. Recall the intuitive characterisation of the
differences between the spacetime structures of GR and pre-relativistic theories given
in Section 1: in GR, the curvature of spacetime varies, not just in time and space, but
across models, and the material content of spacetime influences how it does so. The
fact that the 푔푎푏 of SR2 is the solution of an equation is not a sufficient condition foreither of these features. The 푔푎푏 of SR2 is not affected by matter, because it is whollydetermined (up to isomorphism) by equation (9). Relatedly, in the sense that matters,
the metric structure of spacetime does not differ from DPM to DPM: the 푔푎푏s in anytwo DPMs are isomorphic to one another.26
These features of SR2mean that, if one wishes to remain faithful to the natural pre-
theoretic sense of “background”, it should be classified as a background-dependent
theory. They further suggest that one should regard SR1 and the diffeomorphism-
invariant SR2 as different formulations of the same, background-dependent the-
ory. In contrast, GR1 is (a diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of) a background-
independent theory. This situation might bring to mind Bergmann’s claim, noted in
Section 3, that the distinctive feature of GR is its lack of a non-generally-covariant for-
mulation. This feature of GR could not be equated with its background independence:
a background-dependent theory might lack a non-generally-covariant formulation
because its background structures lack symmetries. However, now we have the dis-
26 Strictly, the global topology of the manifold푀 might allow for infinitely many non-isomorphic
flat metric fields. Even so, these will all be locally isomorphic.
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tinction between general covariance and diffeomorphism invariance on the table, the
general approach might appear more promising.
The idea is that it is the lack of a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation, rather
than the existence of a diffeomorphism-invariant formulation, that is the mark of a
background-independent theory. A non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of a
theory requires that some elements of its models are regarded as fixed, identically the
same from model to model. If a theory is background dependent, in the sense that it
involves non-dynamical fields that (intuitively) do not vary from model to model, then
those fields can be represented by fixed structures in a non-diffeomorphism-invariant
formulation of the theory. But if the theory is background independent, in the sense
that all of its fields can vary from model to model, it lacks elements that can be
represented by fixed structures. Of necessity, it will be diffeomorphism invariant.27
The background fields of a theory are to be identified with those fields that appear as
fixed elements in some non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation that theory. So,
for example, the metric field, 푔푎푏, of SR2 represents background structure because itrepresents the same structure that is represented in the alternative formulation of the
theory, SR1, by 휂푎푏.There is clearly a close connection between identifying a background field in this
way and Anderson’s notion of an absolute object (Anderson, 1964, 1967). I will
return to this connection at the end of the next section, after reviewing one more
complication.
7 Absolute Objects and the Action–Reaction Principle
Assume that background-independent theories can only be formulated in a diffeo-
morphism invariant manner. That leaves open the issue of whether every theory that
must be formulated in a diffeomorphism-invariant manner lacks background fields.
Whether one endorses this further claim in part depends on a subtlety concerning
what it takes to be a background field.
When the metric field of GR is presented as an example of field that, unlike its
precusors in pre-relativistic theories, is not a background field, two of its features are
often run together: (i) like other fields in the theory, the metric is dynamical; (ii) it
also obeys the action–reaction principle: it is affected by every field whose evolution
it constrains. The second feature entails the first (assuming the entity in question is
not entirely dynamically redundant); a field obviously cannot be dynamically affected
and yet not be dynamical. However, the converse implication does not hold. A field
might affect without being affected and yet have non-trivial dynamics of its own.
Consider, for example, the theory (call it GR2) given by the following equations:
27 This proposal fits with some of the more careful claims from the quantum gravity community
concerning the link between background independence and diffeomorphism invariance. For example,
in an informal website article on the meaning of background independence, Baez claims: “making
the metric dynamical instead of a background structure leads to the fact that all diffeomorphisms are
gauge symmetries in general relativity” (Baez, 2000).
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푔푎푏∇푎∇푏Φ = 0, (4)
푅푎푏 = 0. (10)
Here 푅푎푏 is the Ricci tensor associated with 푔푎푏. In other words, equation (10) is thethe vacuum Einstein equation, even though the theory’s models contain a material
scalar field. In this theory the metric is clearly dynamical; it varies from DPM to
DPM. Since it is constrained to obey equation (4), the matter field ‘feels’ the metric.
However, in contrast to the situation in GR, matter does not act back on the metric.
The action–reaction principle is violated. To adapt Einstein’s terminology, as quoted
in Section 2, the metric of GR2 is a causal absolute even though it is a thoroughly
dynamical field.
Should 푔푎푏 count as a background field in this theory? One might naturally char-acterise the metric as a background relative to the dynamics of Φ. It is a kind of
“dynamical background field”. But it does not seem correct to classify the theory as
a whole as background dependent on this account. After all, in those models where
Φ vanishes, the theory just is vacuum GR. This verdict matches that reached if one
sticks with the criterion proposed in the previous section (necessary diffeomorphism
invariance), for GR2 lacks a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation in just the
way GR1 does.
GR2 serves another illustrative purpose. At the end of the previous section I
suggested that there is a link between whether a field can appear as a fixed field in
a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of a theory and whether that field is
an absolute object in Anderson’s sense. Although Anderson informally introduces
absolute objects in terms of their violation of the action–reaction principle, the
definition he goes on to give characterises them in terms of a notion of sameness in
all DPMs of the theory.28 What the metric field 푔푎푏 of GR2 illustrates is that a fieldcan be an action–reaction violating causal absolute without being an absolute object
in the Andersonian sense.
Let us return to the connection between absolute objects and fixed fields. How,
exactly, are they related? The answer is not entirely straightforward, partly because
different authors define absolute objects slightly differently.
Anderson’s formal definition of absolute objects does not characterise them directly.
Instead he defines them in terms of conditions intended to determine when a subset of
the dynamical variables of a theory constitute the components of the theory’s absolute
objects (Anderson, 1967, 83). Friedman (1983, 56–60) later advocated a coordinate-
free characterisation, according to which a geometric object field counts as absolute if
there exist the right kind of maps between any two models of the theory that preserve
the object in question (more details shortly). According to Friedman’s set-up, the
metric fields of both SR1 and SR2 count as absolute objects, even though the metric
28 The values of the absolute objects are said to determine the values non-absolute objects but not vice
versa (Anderson, 1967, 83; see also Anderson and Gautreau, 1969, 1658, fn 6). In Anderson (1964,
192), he says that “an absolute element in a theory indicates a lack of reciprocity.” This is consistent
with absolute objects being sufficient, but not necessary, for a violation of the action–reaction
principle.
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is a fixed field only in SR1.29 This is not true according to Anderson’s definitions. On
his way of setting things up, in a non-covariant coordinate presentation of SR1, there
are no absolute elements, because the metric field is not explicitly represented (cf.
Anderson, 1967, 87). In this formulation of the theory, all of the variables required to
characterise a solution (in this case, the values ofΦ relative to some inertial coordinate
system) are the components of a genuinely dynamical object. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the metric of SR2 counts as an absolute object according to Anderson’s definition.
I suggested above that one should regard SR1 and SR2 as different formulations of
the same theory, and thus regard their metric fields as representing the same element
of physical reality. Generalising this move, one can say that an object that features
as a fixed field in one formulation of a theory will appear as an absolute object in
reformulations of the theory in which that object is no longer treated as fixed.
So far we have noted that fields that are (or can be represented as) fixed are (or can
be represented as) absolute objects. What about the converse? If a diffeomorphism-
invariant theory contains an absolute object, can it be given a non-diffeomorphism-
invariant formulation in which that object features as a fixed field? Here, again, the way
Friedman and Anderson define “absolute object” makes a difference. While both, in
different ways, formalise a notion of “sameness in every model”, Anderson’s notion
of sameness is global whereas Friedman’s is local. More specifically, Friedman
holds that, if the models of a theory take the form ⟨푀,푂1,… , 푂푛⟩, then object
푂푖 is an absolute object just if, for any two models 1 = ⟨푀,푂1,… , 푂푛⟩ and2 = ⟨푀,푂′1,… , 푂′푛⟩, and for every 푝 ∈ 푀 , there are neighbourhoods 퐴 and 퐵of 푝, and a diffeomorphism ℎ ∶ 퐴 → 퐵 such that 푂′푖 = ℎ∗푂푖 on 퐴 ∩ 퐵. Friedman’sabsolute objects can therefore possess “global degrees of freedom”: differences
between such objects might distinguish between classes of DPMs even though the
objects are (in the sense just characterised) everywhere locally indistinguishable.30
The upshot is that a theory that involves absolute objects in Friedman’s sense may not
have a (natural) non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation in terms of fixed fields.
A popular move is to equate background fields and absolute objects, and so to
treat background independence as the lack of absolute objects. Giulini (2007) offers
a careful recent development of this strategy. As Giulini notes, and as is discussed
in depth by Pitts (2006), several “counterexamples” suggest that neither Anderson’s
proposal nor Friedman’s get things just right. The counterexamples come in three
categories. (1) There are cases where structure that, intuitively, should count as
background is not classified as an absolute. (2) There are cases where structure that,
intuitively, should not count as background is classified as an absolute. Finally, (3),
29 Effectively, we are distinguishing two senses of “dynamical”. The metric of SR2 counts as
dynamical in a liberal sense, because it varies non-trivially in the space of KPMs and is constrained
to be what it is in any DPM via the “equation of motion” (9). But in a stricter sense it is not dynamical,
because (up to a diffeomorphism) it is the same in every model of the theory. The stricter sense
takes “dynamical” to mean “not absolute”; the liberal sense takes “dynamical” to mean “not fixed”.
30 Consider, for example, flat Lorentzian metrics on a manifold with non-trivial global topology.
Such metrics need not be globally isometric even though they are everywhere flat. Some models
might be temporally finite whereas others are temporally infinite but spatially finite in a preferred
spatial direction.
22 O. Pooley
it is noted that, on Anderson’s definition (suitably localised), GR itself turns out to
have an absolute object (and so should count as background-dependent).
Torretti’s (1984) example of a theory set in classical spacetimes of arbitrary but
constant spatial curvature is of type (1). Pitts observes that if one decomposes the
spatial metric into a conformal spatial metric density and a scalar density, then the
former is an absolute object while the latter, while constant in space and time, counts
as a genuine, global degree of freedom.
The best-known case of type (2) is the Jones–Geroch example of the “dust” 4-
velocity in GR coupled to matter that is characterised by only a 4-velocity field
and a mass density. Pitts sees both Friedman’s own suggestion—that one take the
4-momentum field of the dust as primitive (Friedman, 1983, 59)—and the option of
defining the “4-velocity” so that it vanishes in matter-free regions, as motivated by
an Andersonian ban on formulations of a theory that contain physically redundant
variables (Pitts, 2006, 361–2).31 My own view is that both of these “solutions” miss
the central problem posed by the example. In the context of this theory, the non-
vanishing velocity field is, intuitively, as dynamical as the the 4-momentum. The
trouble arises not because we mistook as indispensable an object that Anderson’s
definition correctly classifies as absolute. The trouble is that Anderson’s definition,
intuitively, misclassifies that object.
The example suggests that the notion of absolute objects might not, in fact, be
a better candidate than the notion of fixed fields for articulating the sense of “dy-
namical” relevant to characterising background structure. Consider, for example, a
diffeomorphism-invariant formulation of a theory set in Minkowski spacetime and
involving matter characterised, in part, by a (non-vanishing) four-velocity. One can
define two distinct proper subsets of the KPMs (and, correspondingly, the DPMs)
of this theory. The first is obtained by specialising to a particular metric field on
the manifold, and retaining all and only those KPMs (and DPMs) that include this
metric field. The second is obtained by specialising to a particular representation of
the four-velocity. If we view each set of models as determining some theory, then
both theories involve (in some sense) a fixed field. However, in the case of the theory
obtained by specialising to a particular metric, the solution set is identifiable, as a
subspace of the KPMs, via some differential equations for the truly dynamical objects
given the fixed field (the metric). In the case of the “theory” with the fixed velocity
field, in contrast, it seems highly doubtful that we will be able to view the particular
(flat) metrics occurring in the DPMs as all and only the solutions of an equation for
the metric given the velocity field. (Imagine specialising to coordinates in which the
velocity field takes the value (1, 0, 0, 0) and consider how likely it is that the set of
admissible components of the metric field in such coordinates are picked out via an
equation.)
A similar strategy might be pursued in the case of (3). The candidate absolute
object in question is the determinant of the metric,√−푔. One might accept this verdict
without accepting that this automatically means that GR should count as background
31 Pitts pursues the topic further in Pitts (2009).
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dependent. The latter might be held to further require that√−푔 be interpretable as a
fixed field.32
Suppose, however, that one sticks with the proposal that the lack of absolute
objects is equivalent to background independence. What light does that shed on the
relationship between background independence and diffeomorphism invariance? Does
a theory lack a non-diffeomorphism-invariant formulation just if it lacks absolute
objects? We have seen that, not only are fixed fields not absolute objects (on either
Anderson’s definition or Friedman’s), but being representable in terms of a fixed
field is also not equivalent to being an absolute object. Since the presence of fixed
fields would seem to be necessary for the failure of diffeomorphism invariance, this
means that necessary diffeomorphism invariance cannot be equivalent to background
independence understood as lack of absolute objects.
There is a rather desperate way to reconnect the question of whether Diff(푀) is a
symmetry group with background independence: redefine symmetry! For example,
one might try stipulating that Diff(푀) is a symmetry∗ group of a theory 푇 iff, if⟨푀,퐴,퐷⟩ is a model of 푇 , then so is ⟨푀,퐴, 푑∗퐷⟩ for all 푑 ∈ Diff(푀). (Formally
this looks just the definition of diffeomorphism invariance from Section 4, with “퐹 ”,
for “fixed field” replaced by “퐴”, for “absolute object”.) The proposal is problematic,
on at least three grounds.
First, the notion of symmetry∗ is transparently ad hoc. When our theory contained
fixed fields, restricting the action of Diff(푀) to the dynamical (i.e., non-fixed) fields
was natural. Only by doing so could one define a natural group action on the space of
KPMs. The symmetry group is then naturally defined to be the subgroup of this group
that fixes the space of DPMs. When one has a diffeomorphism-invariant theory that
includes absolute objects, one (obviously!) does not need to stipulate that Diff(푀)
acts only on the dynamical (i.e. non-absolute) fields in order for its action on the
space of KPMs to be well defined.
Second, defining the action of Diff(푀) on the space of KPMs in such a way that
it does not act on the 퐴s breaks the natural definition of symmetry. The definition
yields, as intended, that a theory with, say, a flat Lorentzian metric as its absolute
object will fail to have Diff(푀) as a symmetry∗ group. But it will also fail to have the
Poincaré group as a symmetry∗ group. For any given solution ⟨푀,퐴,퐷⟩, the maximal
group 퐺 such that, for all 푔 ∈ 퐺, ⟨푀,퐴, 푔∗퐷⟩ is a solution, will be isomorphic to the
Poincaré group (or, possibly, a supergroup of the Poincaré group). But for two arbitrary
solutions ⟨푀,퐴,퐷⟩ and ⟨푀,퐴′, 퐷′⟩, the groups so defined need not coincide. In
fact, in general, they will coincide only when 퐴 = 퐴′.33
32 Can the the equations of the theory be interpreted as equations for the other variables given fixed√
−푔? This seems to be the correct verdict for unimodular GR, but not (or not clearly so) for GR
itself. For further discussion of this case, although not in terms of the notion of fixed fields, see
Earman (2003); Pitts (2006); Sus (2008, 2010).
33 Invariance, as I defined it in Section 4, is called covariance by Anderson (1967, 75). He defines a
theory’s symmetry, or “invariance” group as the “largest subgroup of the covariance group. . .which
is simultaneously the symmetry group of its absolute objects” (Anderson, 1967, 87). It would seem,
therefore, that Anderson’s symmetry group is related to the notion of symmetry∗ in exactly the
way the group of automorphisms of the fixed fields of a theory is related the symmetry group (as
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Suppose one circumvents these problems by adding some epicycles to the definition
of symmetry∗. There remains a third reason to be dissatisfied with the proposal that
background independence is equivalent to Diff(푀)’s being a symmetry∗ group. At
bottom, what is doing all the work is the notion of absolute object, in terms of which
the gerrymandered notion of symmetry is defined. If our interest is in characterising
background independence, why not simply characterise it as the lack of absolute
objects and be done with it? In particular, the detour via symmetry∗ does not give us a
better handle on GR’s background independence versus SR’s background dependence.
8 Diff(푴) as a Variational Symmetry Group
When physicists talk of a generally-covariant formulation of a specially relativistic
theory, they typically have in mind a formulation like SR1. Undue focus on such exam-
ples, at the expense of examples like SR2, might explain why the connection between
background independence and diffeomorphism invariance is sometimes taken to be
tighter than it really is. However, theories along the lines of SR2 do get considered
by those who defend a diffeomorphism-invariance/background-independence link.
As we have seen, the possibility of such formulations of specially relativistic theories
is central to Anderson’s thinking (and explains the idiosyncrasies of his definition of
symmetry). The option is also considered by Rovelli, who concedes:
even full diffeomorphism invariance, should probably not be interpreted as a rigid selection
principle, capable of selecting physical theories just by itself. With sufficient acrobatics, any
theory can perhaps be re-expressed in a diffeomorphism invariant language. . . .
But there are prices to pay. First, [SR2]. . . has a “fake” dynamical field, since 푔 is con-
strained to a single solution up to gauges, by the second equation of the system. Having no
physical degrees of freedom, 푔 is physically a fixed background field, in spite of the trick of
declaring it a variable and then constraining the variable to a single solution. Second, we
can insist on a lagrangian formulation of the theory. . . (Sorkin, 2002), but to do this we must
introduce an additional field, and it can then be argued that the resulting theory, having an
additional field is different from [the original] (Earman, 1989). (Rovelli, 2007)
Several comments are in order. First, reference to “sufficient acrobatics” seems
like hyperbole, given the relatively straightforward nature of the transition from a
theory like SR1 to a reformulation along the lines of SR2.
Second, it is true that, in SR2, 푔푎푏 is a “fake” dynamical field. It should be classifiedas background structure. Despite our treating it as dynamical in the liberal sense,
it remains non-dynamical in a stricter sense. The previous sections have reviewed
apparatus that allows us to draw precisely these distinctions, and to differentiate GR1
and SR2, despite both theories being equally diffeomorphism invariant. So, it is not
defined in Section 4) of that theory. In both cases one should expect the former to be a (possibly
proper) subset of the latter. But we have just seen that, without some finessing, the symmetry∗ group
of a theory will be trivial. The same trouble afflicts a flatfooted reading of Anderson’s definition.
Consider SR2. The symmetry group of any particular absolute 푔휇휈 , occurring in a particular DPM,will be (isomorphic to) the Poincaré group (cf. Anderson, 1967, 87), but the only diffeomorphism
that belongs to every such group is the identity map.
Background Independence 25
clear why there is a “price to pay” in adopting such a formulation, particularly since
we are regarding SR2 as merely a reformulation of SR1. Rovelli, perhaps, would
question this last stance. The diffeomorphism invariance of any theory might be taken
to have significant implications for the nature of the true physical magnitudes of the
theory, and thus require that one distinguish SR2 from (the non-diffeomorphism-
invariant) SR1. If so, I disagree, for reasons I explain in the final section of this
paper.
Third, and most interestingly, Rovelli’s description of the second cost suggests a
quite different way to connect the question of whether diffeomorphisms are symme-
tries to background independence. Prima facie, there is a formal difference between
SR2 and GR1 that I have not so far mentioned. The two theories are defined on the
same space of KPMs. In the case of GR1, the space of solutions picked out by its
equations can also be fixed via a variational problem defined in terms of the action
푆GR1 = ∫ 푑4푥(퐺 + Φ).34 On the face of it, the same is not true of SR2. One canpick out the solution space of SR1 in terms of a variational problem, defined via
the action 푆SR1 = ∫ 푑4푥Φ, where Φ depends on the fixed metric field 휂푎푏. In thecontext of the space of KPMs common to GR1 and SR2, however, elements in the
solution space of SR2 are not stationary points of ∫ 푑4푥Φ. The latter can identifiedby considering the Euler–Lagrange equations one obtains by applying Hamilton’s
principle to both Φ and 푔푎푏. From the first, one gets the Klein–Gordon equation, butfrom the second one gets the trivialising condition that the stress-energy tensor for Φ
vanishes.
These reflections might suggest that background independence could be linked to
the symmetry status of Diff(푀) in the following way:
Background Independence (version 1). A theory 푇 is background independent if
and only if it can be formulated in terms of a variational problem for which Diff(푀)
is a variational symmetry group.
Although one can write an action for SR1 in a generally-covariant or coordinate-
independent manner, Diff(푀) is not a symmetry group of the variational problem that
defines the theory’s models.35 Recall that the action of Diff(푀) on the SR1’s space
of KPMs acts on Φ but not on 휂푎푏, and does not leave the space of DPMs invariant.A useful alternative way of stating the proposed condition is as follows:
Background Independence (version 2). A theory 푇 is background independent if
and only if its solution space is determined by a generally covariant action all of
whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s principle.
This rules out the generally-covariant version of the SR1 action principle, since in
this case only Φ and not 휂푎푏 is subject to Hamilton’s principle. It will also rule out
SR2 if the solution space of this theory really is not obtainable from an appropriately
formulated action principle.
34 The “gravitational” part of the Lagrangian is the Einstein–Hilbert Lagrangian 퐺 = √−푔휅푅,where 푅 is the curvature scalar and 휅 is a suitable constant. The “matter” term is the standard
Lagrangian for the massless Klein–Gordon field: Φ =√−푔푔푎푏∇푎Φ∇푏Φ.
35 See Belot (2007, 161–2) for further discussion of the notion of a variational symmetry.
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Despite these promising results, the proposal does not work. In the quotation
above, Rovelli refers to Sorkin (2002). In that paper, Sorkin, rediscovering a procedure
originally employed by Rosen (1966), shows how one can derive equations (4) and
(9) from a diffeomorphism-invariant action. One obtains a Sorkin-type action by
replacing 퐺 in 푆GR1 with a different “gravitational” term, 푆 =√−푔Θ푎푏푐푑푅푎푏푐푑 .
The theory therefore involves a Lagrange multiplier field, Θ푎푏푐푑 , in addition to the
fields common to SR2 andGR1. In this new action, all the dependent variables are to
be subject to Hamilton’s principle. For ease of reference, let us call the resulting theory
(so formulated) SR3. Varying Θ푎푏푐푑 leads to equation (9). Since Φ does not occur in푆 , varying this field has the same effect as in GR1, and leads to the Klein–Gordonequation (4). (One also needs to consider variations of 푔푎푏. Rather than the EFE, thisleads to an equation that relates Θ푎푏푐푑 , 푔푎푏 and Φ.)36Let us assume, for the moment, that in SR3 we have yet another way to formulate
the specially relativistic theory that has been our example throughout this paper. Since
its models are determined by a diffeomorphism-invariant action, all of whose depen-
dent variables are subject to Hamilton’s principle, the theory counts as background
independent according to our latest proposal. The proposal therefore needs to be
revised. A natural thought is to amend it as follows:
Background Independence (version 3). A theory 푇 is background independent if
and only if its solution space is determined by a generally-covariant action: (i) all of
whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s principle, and (ii) all of whose
dependent variables represent physical fields.
The idea is that SR3 fails to satisfy the second of these conditions because the
dynamics of the additional field Θ푎푏푐푑 strongly suggest that it is not a physical field. It
makes no impact on the evolution of 푔푎푏 and Φ and hence, were it a genuine elementof reality, it would be completely unobservable (on the natural assumption that our
empirical access to it would be through its effect on “standard” matter fields such
as Φ). Indeed, it is only on the basis of interpreting Θ푎푏푐푑 as a mere mathematical
device that one can view SR3 as a reformulation of SR2.
In the quotation at the start of this section, Rovelli suggests that one might instead
regard SR3 as a different theory from SR2, on the grounds that SR3 involves an
additional field (presumably because one views this field as representing a genuine
element of reality, the points just made notwithstanding). This might seem to pro-
vide an alternative way to argue that our revised proposal does not classify SR2 as
background independent on the basis of SR3’s satisfying its conditions: if SR3 is
a different theory, it clearly does not show that the solutions of SR2 can be derived
from a diffeomorphism-invariant action.
While this might get the classification of SR2 correct, it does so at the cost of
misclassifying SR3. According to the current suggestion, SR3 now is a theory that
36 Note that the evolution of Θ푎푏푐푑 is constrained by, but does not affect the evolutions of 푔푎푏 and Φ.The action–reaction principle is therefore violated by Φ, with respect to Θ푎푏푐푑 , and not just by 푔푎푏.The theory illustrates that requiring that all of the dependent variables in an action be subject to
Hamilton’s principle does not entail that the resulting theory satisfies the action–reaction principle,
pace Baez (2000).
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meets the conditions for being background independent. But this is not the right
result. The fact the the equation of motion for its metric field is derived from a
diffeomorphism-invariant action expressed only in terms of physical fields, hardly
makes that metric more dynamical than the metric of SR2. After all, they both
obey exactly the same equation of motion. And once this problem is recognised,
reclassifying Θ푎푏푐푑 as unphysical does not seem like enough to salvage the proposal.
Even if SR3 is no longer a counterexample, might there not be a relevantly similar
theory that the proposal incorrectly classifies as background independent? The Rosen–
Sorkin method is not the only way to construct a diffeomorphism-invariant variational
problem for a theory that involves non-dynamical fields. These alternative procedures
arguably provide examples of exactly the type envisaged.
One such procedure, developed by Karel Kuchař, is parameterization. In the sim-
plest case one starts with the Lorentz-covariant expression for the action, defined with
respect to inertial frame coordinates. Note that the field 휂푎푏 does not explicitly occurin this expression. One then treats the four coordinate fields푋휇 of this formulation as
themselves dependent variables (“clock fields”), writes them as functions of arbitrary
coordinates, 푋휇 = 푋휇(푥휈), and re-expresses the Lagrangian in terms of these new
variables. Hamilton’s principle is applied to the original dynamical variables, now
conceived of as functions of 푥휈 , and to the coordinate fields, 푋휇. In our simple
example of SR1, stationarity under variations of Φ leads to an equation for Φ and
푋휇 that is satisfied just if Φ satisfies the standard Lorentz-covariant Klein–Gordon
equation (1) with respect to the 푋휇. Stationarity under variations of the 푋휇 yields
equations that are automatically satisfied if the first equation is satisfied (see, e.g.,
Varadarajan, 2007, §II.A). Let us call the resulting theory SR4.
Another technique is described by Lee and Wald (1990, 734).37 Let the KPMs
of SR5 be defined in terms of two maps from the spacetime manifold,푀 . One is
our familiar scalar field Φ. The other is a diffeomorphism 푦 into a copy of spacetime,
푀̃ , that is equipped with a particular flat Lorentzian metric field. One can use the
diffeomorphism 푦 to pull back the metric on 푀̃ onto푀 , and use the result, 푔푎푏(푦), to
define the standard Lagrangian, Φ(푦,Φ) =√−푔(푦)푔(푦)푎푏(∇푎Φ)(∇푏Φ), and actionfunctional 푆 = ∫ 푑4푥Φ. To determine the theory’s solutions we require that 푆 isstationary under variations in both of the theory’s fundamental variables, 푦 and Φ. Φ
variations give us that Φ satisfies the Klein–Gordon equation with respect to 푔푎푏(푦).Variations in 푦 give equations that involve the vanishing of terms that are proportional
to∇푛푇 푛푏, where 푇 푎푏 is the stress-energy tensor forΦ. Since∇푛푇 푛푏 = ퟎ follows fromthe Klein–Gordon equation, these equations are automatically satisfied.
Both SR4 and SR5 are examples of theories defined by diffeomorphism-invariant
actions all of whose dependent variables are subject to Hamilton’s principle. They
will therefore be counterexamples to our latest proposal just if (i) they are background
dependent and (ii) all of their fields are physical fields. One way to explore whether
(i) and (ii) are satisfied is to consider how the theories relate to SR2. In particular,
if they count as reformulations of SR2, then they are formulations of a background
dependent theory.
37 See Belot (2007, 206–9) for an extended discussion of this example.
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First, recall that a model of SR2 is a triple of the form ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩, where 푔푎푏is flat. A model of SR4, is of the form ⟨푀,Φ, 푋0, 푋1, 푋2, 푋3⟩. That is, it lacks a
(primitive) field 푔푎푏, and includes instead four scalar fields. Finally, models of SR5 areof the form ⟨푀,푦,Φ⟩, where 푦 is a diffeomorphism into 푀̃ , a copy of푀 equipped
with a fixed metric.
For both SR4 and SR5, there is a natural map from that theory’s solution space
to the solution space of SR2. For SR4, one first defines the unique flat metric
field 푔푋푎푏 associated with the fields 푋휇 (the metric for which the 푋휇 are every-where Riemmann–normal coordinates). One then requires that the map associates⟨푀,Φ, 푋0, 푋1, 푋2, 푋3⟩ with ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩ just if 푔푋푎푏 = 푔푎푏. For SR5, ⟨푀,푦,Φ⟩maps to ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩ just if 푔(푦)푎푏 = 푔푎푏. In the first case, the map is many-one. Thesolution space of SR4 is intuitively ‘bigger’ than that of SR2. In the case of SR5,
however, the map is a bijection.
This machinery helps articulate how both SR4 and SR5 can naturally be viewed as
reformulations of SR2.38 First, consider SR4. For any model of SR2 one can choose
special coordinates that encode its metric via the requirement that, in these coordinate
systems, 푔푎푏 = diag(−1, 1, 1, 1). In order to understand SR4 as a reformulation of
SR2, one interprets the fundamental fields of SR4 to be such coordinate fields. So
interpreted, SR4 is a formulation of a background-dependent theory, since SR2 is.
Do the푋휇 count as “physical fields”? Unlike theΘ푎푏푐푑 of SR3, they certainly encode
something physical, since they encode the metrical facts. But there is also a sense
in which they do not themselves directly represent something physical: coordinate
systems are not physical objects. Note also that encoding a flat metric via special
coordinates in the manner proposed does not uniquely determine the coordinates. If
{푋휇} corresponds to one such set of fields, then so will any set {푋′휇} where the
푋′휇 are related to the 푋휇 by a Poincaré transformation. This is the source of the
fact that the map from models of SR4 to those of SR2 is many-one. This means that
(on the suggested interpretation our formalism) the {푋휇} contain some redundancy;
“internal” Poincaré transformations 푋휇 ↦ 푋′휇 should be regarded as mere gauge
re-descriptions.
The nature of the bijection between the solution space of SR5 and that of SR2
makes their interpretation as reformulations of the same background-dependent theory
even more straightforward. Are SR5’s basic variables physical fields? The dynamical
role of 푦 is exhausted by its use to define the pull-back metric on푀 . It is only through
this metric that 푦 enters into the Lagrangian of the theory. Nonetheless, there is again
a clear sense in which the machinery involves arbitrary elements that do not represent
the physical facts directly. In particular, we might have set up the theory in terms of a
different (but still flat) metric on the target manifold. As a mathematical object, this
would constitute a different formulation of the theory, and yet the difference does not
show up at the level of the pulled-back metrics on푀 : the same range of metrics for
푀 is surveyed, just via different maps to a different object.
38 A similar observation can be made concerning SR3. Its models are of the form ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ,Θ푎푏푐푑⟩and the map from its solution space to that of SR2 simply involves throwing away Θ푎푏푐푑 :⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ,Θ푎푏푐푑⟩ ↦ ⟨푀,푔푎푏,Φ⟩. This map is many-one, but the differences between SR3 modelsmapped to the same SR2 model concern differences in the non-physical field Θ푎푏푐푑 .
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The upshot is that it is not clear whether SR4 and SR5, interpreted as reformula-
tions of SR2, constitute counterexamples to the proposed criterion for background
independence. All hinges on whether the relevant fields count as physical fields.
They clearly encode physical facts but, equally clearly, they do not do so in the most
perspicuous manner. One might seek to solve this dilemma via further proscriptive
modifications to the proposal. This, of course, risks creating further problems.39 More
importantly, one should recognise that we are now far past the point where one might
hope to articulate a simple and illuminating connection between diffeomorphism
invariance and background independence.
Rovelli writes:
Diffeomorphism invariance is the key property of the mathematical language used to express
the key conceptual shift introduced with GR: the world is not formed by a fixed non-dynamical
spacetime structure, which defines localization and on which the dynamical fields live. Rather,
it is formed solely by dynamical fields in interactions with one another. Localization is only
defined, relationally, with respect to the fields themselves. (Rovelli, 2007, 1312)
The moral of our investigation so far is that diffeomorphism invariance cannot be
taken to express the shift from non-dynamical to only dynamical spacetime structures.
Theories with non-dynamical structure can be formulated in a fully diffeomorphism-
invariant manner. But note that Rovelli’s description of the key conceptual shift intro-
duced with GR involves two elements. In addition to the move from non-dynamical
to dynamical spacetime, there is the claim that, in GR, “localization is only defined,
relationally, with respect to the fields themselves.” I agree that this is how one should
understand diffeomorphism-invariant theories. What the existence of diffeomorphism-
invariant formulations of theories with non-dynamical structure indicates, however, is
that this feature of a theory is not peculiar to theories that lack non-dynamical fields.
A diffeomorphism-invariant, relational approach to “localization” is as appropriate in
the context of Newtonian physics and special relativity as it is in GR. A defence of
this claim is the task of the last two sections.
9 An Aside on the Gauge Status of Diff(푴)
My central claim is this: the observable content of, and the nature of the genuine
physical magnitudes of, a specially relativistic theory, whether formulated along
the lines of SR1 or SR2, are identical in nature to those of an analogue generally
relativistic theory, such as GR1. In the next section I will spell out how this can be
so. In this section, I say a little about when one should interpret diffeomorphisms as
gauge transformations.
In the previous section, we saw that Rovelli claimed that SR3 might be distin-
guished from SR2 on the grounds that the former involves an additional field. In the
39 For example, does the metric field of GR1 represent the physical facts in the most perspicuous
manner? If GR1 is not to count as fully background independent, it should not be on account of this
type of failure.
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passage quoted above, he cites Earman, who does indeed argue that one should distin-
guish SR3 from more standard formulations of specially relativistic Klein–Gordon
theory. Earman’s reasoning, however, is rather different from Rovelli’s.
Earman (2006b) defines (massive variants of) SR1, SR2 and SR3, via the ana-
logues of the equations considered earlier in this paper.40 (To ease exposition, I use
this paper’s labels to refer to Earman’s theories.) He is primarily concerned with the
comparison between SR1 (as obtained from an action principle) and SR3. Earman’s
reasons for differentiating the theories, unlike Rovelli’s, have nothing directly to do
with the presence of an additional field. He views the theories as distinct because he
believes that, in the context of SR1, Φ can be treated as an observable but, in SR3, it
cannot because: (i) only gauge-invariant quantities are observable and (ii) one should
regard the Diff(푀) symmetry of SR3 as a gauge symmetry. Earman takes (ii) to be
justified by the fact that Diff(푀) is both a local and a variational symmetry group
in the context of SR3. In reaching this judgement in this way, he takes himself to
be applying a “uniform method for getting a fix on gauge that applies to any theory
in mathematical physics whose equations of motion/field equations are derivable
from an action principle” and that is “generally accepted in the physics community”
(Earman, 2002, 19).
As I have argued elsewhere (Pooley, 2010), the fact that this apparatus tells us that
Diff(푀) is not a gauge group of SR1 is not surprising. Diff(푀) is not a symmetry
group of SR1 and so a fortiori it is not a gauge symmetry group. What one really
wishes to know is whether one should viewDiff(푀) as a gauge group of SR2. Earman
does not address this question head-on, but one suspects that his answer would be
in the negative, for he argues that the solution sets of SR1 and SR2 are the same
(Earman, 2006b, 455). This, of course, simply cannot be correct. It cannot be the case
that (i) Diff(푀) is not a symmetry group of SR1; (ii) Diff(푀) is a symmetry group
of SR2; and (iii) the solution sets of SR1 and SR2 are the same. It is (iii) that should
be given up, and it will be instructive to see where Earman’s argument goes wrong.
Here is what he says:
The solution sets for [SR1] and for [SR2] are the same, at least on the assumption that
the spacetime manifold is ℝ4. For then there is a global coordinate system {푥휇} such that
푔휇휈 = 휂휇휈 (where 휂휇휈 is the Minkowski matrix) solves [(9)]. Moreover, in this coordinate
system [(4)] reduces to [(3)41]. And every solution of [(9)] can be transformed, by a suitable
coordinate transformation, into a solution of the form 푔휇휈 = 휂휇휈 . Thus, every solution of[SR2] is a solution of [SR1]. Similar reasoning shows that the converse is also true. (Earman,
2006b, 455, 466, n 26)
This argument, effectively, ignores the distinction between fields that are solutions to
equations and fields that feature in equations as fixed fields. Here is one way to see
the error. Fix a coordinate system 퐾 on푀 (of the kind Earman considers). Relative
40 His equation (3) (Earman, 2006b, 451) is (once corrected) the massive analogue of my (3), and
defines his SR1-type theory. His equations (5) and (6) (Earman, 2006b, 455) are the analogues of
(4) and (9), and define his SR2-type theory.
41 Since Earman refers to 휂휇휈 as the Minkowski matrix, and since he has switched from Romanindices—which I interpret as signalling coordinate-free, abstract index notation—to Greek indices,
it would seem more appropriate to refer to his equation (2), i.e., to equation (1), rather than to his (3).
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to 퐾 , 휂푎푏 always has the same components in the coordinate representation of everysolution of SR1. Every one of these coordinate descriptions is also a description
with respect to 퐾 of a solution of SR2. But, in addition to these, every possible set
of coordinate functions that one can obtain from the original sets by acting by a
diffeomorphism on ℝ4 also describes—still relative to 퐾—a solution of SR2. Note,
too, that each of these additional sets of coordinate functions corresponds (relative
to 퐾) to a representation of a (mathematically, though not necessarily physically)
distinct solution of SR2. But these new coordinate functions are not descriptions
of solutions of SR1 relative to 퐾 (the components of the metric tensor have been
changed, so they no longer describe 휂푎푏).42I conclude that Earman’s claims do not speak against the natural interpretation of
Diff(푀) as a gauge group of SR2. His own favoured apparatus is simply silent on
the question. When physicists themselves justify the use of the apparatus to identify
gauge freedom, they take the deterministic nature of the theories in question as a
premise (see, e.g., Dirac, 1964, 20). In the context of SR2, this premise also leads to
the conclusion that Diff(푀) is a gauge group. In fact, Belot (2008) shows how one
can regiment the intuitions that are arguably behind such arguments in order to define
a notion of gauge equivalence that matches Earman’s favoured notion in its verdicts
concerning Lagrangian theories but which applies more widely. Unsuprisingly, Belot’s
definition tells us that Diff(푀) is a gauge group of SR2. There remains just one task.
We need to see how this interpretative stance with respect to SR2 can be reconciled
with an relatively orthodox account of nature of the observables of both background-
dependent SR and background-independent GR.
10 On the Meaning of Coordinates
Recall, again, the similarities between GR1 and SR2. The two theories share a
space of KPMs. They differ only in terms of which subsets of this space are picked
out as dynamically possible. The DPMs of each theory, although distinct sets of
mathematical objects, are sets of the same kind of objects. That much is mathematical
fact. These similarities, I submit, make plausible the following interpretative stance:
one should treat the two theories uniformly. On this view, the physical magnitudes of
the two theories describe the same types of physical objects. The theories postulate
the same kind of stuff; they just differ over which configurations of this stuff are
physically possible.
Why might one reject such a view? The reason, I think, has to do with a popular,
but potentially misleading, way of thinking about the coordinates of non-generally-
covariant formulations of pre-relativistic theories. As I will describe in a moment,
this way of thinking about the coordinates of, for example, Lorentz-invariant theories
42 They can be understood as descriptions of solutions of SR1, but only if we allow ourselves to
describe things with respect to coordinate systems other than 퐾 (in fact, we need to consider one
coordinate system for each class related by Poincaré transformations). And when we do this, each
solution of SR1 is, of course, multiply represented.
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has implications for how one conceives of the content of those theories. It leads to a
way of thinking about the theory’s physical content that does not transfer to theories
without special coordinates. The lack of non-dynamical background fields entails
(though, as we saw, cannot be equated with) the lack of such coordinates. It is therefore
natural to see the shift from SR to GR, in which background structures are excised,
as heralding a radical change in the nature of the content of our physical theories.
Against this, I want to highlight an alternative way of conceiving of the special
coordinates of a non-covariant physics. This alternative way is perfectly compatible
with the fundamental nature of the content of our physics remaining unchanged in the
passage from background dependence to background independence. It also provides
an independently plausible account of the content of background dependent-theories,
such as SR.
The influence of the problematic view might well flow from the following passage
in Einstein’s groundbreaking paper on special relativity:
The theory to be developed—like every other electrodynamics—is based upon the kinematics
of rigid bodies, since the assertions of any such theory concern relations between rigid bodies
(systems of coordinates), clocks, and electromagnetic processes. (Einstein, 1905, 38, my
emphasis)
Einstein seems here to be claiming that the meaning of the theoretical claims of
Lorentz-invariant electromagnetism—that is, what those claims are fundamentally
about—concerns the relationships between electromagnetic phenomena and rods
and clocks. In other words, the content of the theory’s claims is held to be about
relationships between electromagnetic phenomena and material bodies outside of the
electromagnetic system under study.
Versions of this type of view, as an interpretation of the special coordinates of
specially-relativistic and Newtonian physics, are explicitly endorsed by, for example,
Stachel (1993, 141–2), Westman and Sonego (2009, 1592–3) and, in several places,
Rovelli. To give a flavour of the importance of the view for Rovelli, I quote at length:
For Newton, the coordinates 푥⃗ that enter his main equation
퐹⃗ = 푚d
2푥⃗(푡)
d푡2
(2.152)
are the coordinates of absolute space. However, since we cannot directly observe space, the
only way we can coordinatize space points is by using physical objects. The coordinates
푥⃗. . . are therefore defined as distances from a chosen system 푂 of objects, which we call a
“reference frame”. . .
In other words, the physical content of (2.152) is actually quite subtle:
There exist reference objects 푂 with respect to which the motion of any other object 퐴 is
correctly described by (2.152). . .
Notice also that for this construction to work it is important that the objects 푂 forming
the reference frame are not affected by the motion of the object 퐴. There shouldn’t be any
dynamical interaction between 퐴 and 푂. (Rovelli, 2004, 87–8)43
43 A similar claim is found in Rovelli (1997, 187–9). There Rovelli combines the claim that in
pre-relativistic physics “reference system objects are not part of the dynamical system studied, their
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The similarity with Einstein’s claim is clear. The “physical content” of an equation
of restricted covariance turns out to involve claims about relations between the
dynamical quantities that are explicitly represented in the equations and other material
bodies that are only implicitly represented via the special coordinates. There is one
difference worth noting. For Einstein, the important role of external bodies is to
make meaningful spatial and temporal intervals; the bodies in question are rods and
clocks. Rovelli, in contrast, emphasises two other roles played by the bodies of his
reference system: they fix a particular coordinate system (define its origin) and, more
importantly, they define same place over time. In fact, in spelling out his notion of
a material reference system, Rovelli seems to take the notion of spatial distance as
primitive and empirically unproblematic.
Now contrast this Einstein–Stachel–Rovelli (ESR) way of understanding special
coordinates to what I will call the Anderson–Trautman–Friedman (ATF) perspec-
tive (recall footnote 13), which has already been adopted throughout in this paper.
According to this latter view, a generally-covariant formulation of a theory has the
advantage over formulations of limited covariance of making the physical content of
the theory fully explicit. This content includes certain spatiotemporal structures, such
as those encoded by the Minkowski metric field 휂푎푏. In cases where these structuresare highly symmetric, one can encode certain physical quantities (e.g., spatiotemporal
intervals) via special choices of coordinates adapted to these structures. Newton’s
special coordinates are not fundamentally defined in terms of, and Newton’s equations
do not make implicit reference to, external material bodies. Rather they are equations
that encode physically meaningful chronometric and inertial structure, via certain
“gauge fixing” coordinate conditions.44
In order to avoid confusion, let me stress that according to both the ESR view
and the ATF view the special coordinates of a non-covariant form of pre-relativistic
physics have a different meaning to arbitrary coordinates in GR (or a generally
covariant form of the pre-relativistic theory). On both views the special coordinates
have physical meaning. The accounts just differ over what that physical meaning is.
To help further clarify the differences between two views, let me highlight three
distinct features that concrete applications of coordinate systems must or may have.
1. The coordinate system must be anchored to the world in some way. If it is to
be concretely applied, and predictively effective, we must be able to practically
determine which coordinate values particular observable events are to be assigned.
2. The coordinate system might be anchored to the world by observable material
objects outside of the system under study. (The system under study might be a
proper subsystem of the universe.)
3. The coordinate system might partially encode, or be partially defined in terms
of, physically meaningful spatiotemporal quantities (spacetime intervals; inertial
motion. . . is independent from the dynamics of the system studied” with the further assertion that
the “mathematical expression” of the failure of this condition in GR is “the invariance of Einstein’s
equations under active diffeomorphisms.”
44 Specifically, one imposes Γ휇휈휌 = 0, 푡휇 = (1, 0, 0, 0) and ℎ휇휈 = diag(0, 1, 1, 1), where Γ휇휈휌 are thecomponents of the connection, 푡휇 are the components of the one-form that defines the temporalmetric and ℎ휇휈 are the components of the spatial metric.
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trajectories etc.). In order for this to be applied in concrete cases, we require
physical systems that disclose these facts. Further, these systems may or may not
be external to the system being modelled by our theory.
The ATF perspective wholly concerns the third point: the special coordinates
of non-generally-covariant formulations of theories encode physical magnitudes. It
is simply silent on the issues raised in the first two points. The ESR perspective
assumes such encoding too, but it makes various further commitments concerning
how such coordinate systems are anchored to the world, and what kind of systems
disclose the magnitudes that the coordinate systems encoded. It is important to see
that these additional claims are not necessary concomitants of the idea that there is
such encoding.
To see this, consider how one might in practice get one’s hands on an ATF special
coordinate system. The coordinates encode spatial intervals and temporal intervals.
So one needs to be able to measure spatial and temporal intervals. But without further
argument, one’s ability to measure these should not be taken to require that the rods
and clocks one uses are outside the system that one is describing, much less outside
the scope of the theory one is using. Note that such spatiotemporal measurement
is equally essential to the concrete application of GR, not now to give meaning to
special coordinates, but to give empirical content to one of the dynamical fields that
is explicitly described.
The ESR idea that, necessarily, special coordinates in pre-relativistic physics gain
their meaning from material systems outside the system being studied, blurs the
distinction between (i) coordinates encoding physical magnitudes that are disclosed
by systems not covered by the theory in question and (ii) the coordinates being
anchored to the world via material systems outside the system under study. Rovelli’s
idea that “localisation” is inherently non-relational in pre-relativistic physics really
only relies on (ii). However, it is easy to see that (ii) is not an intrinsic feature of
the special coordinates of pre-relativistic physics. Even if in practice we often use
physical systems to measure spatiotemporal intervals (and thereby fix the “magnitude-
encoding” aspect of the coordinate system) that we do not (or cannot) actually model
in our theory, the anchoring of particular coordinates to the world might simply
involve the stipulation that some qualitatively characterisable components of the
system under study are to be given such-and-such coordinate values.
Consider the case of a Lorentz-covariant formulation of our theory of the specially-
relativistic scalar field, for which Φ(푥) is supposed to be an “observable”, in contrast
to the analogous quantity in GR. If the special coordinate system in terms of which Φ
is being described is anchored to the world by some reference system not described by
the theory, and if the coordinates are understood as encoding objective spatiotemporal
quantities, then it is clear what physical meaning Φ(푥0) is supposed to have (for anygiven, particular 푥0) and what the difference in meaning is between the quantities
Φ(푥0) andΦ(푥0+Δ푥). However—and this is the absolutely crucial observation—suchcoordinate representations of Φ can also be understood to be physically meaningful
(in essentially the same way) without understanding them in terms of “non-relational
localisation” thought of as provided by an external anchor for the coordinate system.
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Imagine, for example, that onemeasuresΦ to take a certain value (at one’s location).
One stipulates that this value is to be given coordinate values 푥0.45 One then askswhat value the theory predicts that the field will take at a certain spatiotemporal
distance away from the observed value. Since such spatiotemporal distances are
encoded in the coordinates of the Lorentz-covariant formulation of the theory, this is
to ask what the theory predicts the value of Φ(푥0 + Δ푥) will be, given the value of
Φ(푥0), where the coordinate differenceΔ푥 encodes the spatiotemporal interval we areinterested in. Note that, conceived of in this way,Φ(푥) andΦ(푥+Δ푥) specify, not two
independently predictable quantities ultimately defined in terms of the relationship of
Φ to an unstated reference object, but a single diffeomorphism-invariant coincidence
quantity, involving how the variation of Φ is related to the underlying metric field
휂푎푏.If one considers Newtonian physics or special relativity as potentially providing
complete cosmological theories, then any anchoring of special coordinate systems
has to be done, ultimately, in this second way. Moreover, any systems that disclose
the metric facts are, by hypothesis, describable by the theory. Of course, this is not
how we now understand the empirical applicability of Newtonian physics or special
relativity in the actual world. But the point is that there is no logical incoherence in
so conceiving of them. Indeed, it was the interpretation each was assumed to have
prior to 1905 and 1915 respectively. A theory’s including non-dynamical background
fields does not, per se, preclude such a cosmological interpretation.
To summarise, the additional commitments of the ESR interpretation of coor-
dinates, over those of the ATF view, are not necessary consequences of a theory’s
being background-dependent in the sense of involving non-dynamical structure. The
conditions that ESR write into the very meaning of all special coordinate systems
might correctly characterise some concrete applications of such systems, but they
need not do so. In fact, sometimes, they do not do so. Consider, for example, a case
whose philosophical importance is stressed by Julian Barbour: the use of Newtonian
mechanics by astronomers to determine ephemeris time and the inertial frames.46
Here certain facts about simultaneity and spatial distances are determined “exter-
nally”, but the way the coordinate system is anchored to the world, and the way some
of the spatiotemporal quantities encoded by the coordinate system are determined
(time intervals and an inertial standard of equilocality) are not.
There is, perhaps, one qualification to be made. I have argued that, in the context
of classical background-dependent physics, the ESR story about special coordinate
systems does not provide an analysis of their fundamental meaning. This, however,
does not rule out something like the story being correct for background-dependent
quantum theory. In this context, the suggestion would be that certain (non-quantum)
background structure in the theory, namely, Minkowski spacetime geometry, really
45 In reality, in order both to provide a uniquely identifying description of the field that allows us to
anchor the coordinate system, and to provide sufficient initial data that a prediction can be extracted
from the theory, one should really consider the observation of a certain qualitatively characterisable
and spatially extended continuum of field values. This complication does not alter the basic structure
of the story given in the text.
46 For a popular account that stresses the philosophical morals, see Barbour (1999, Ch. 6)
36 O. Pooley
does acquire physical meaning via an implicit appeal to physical systems outside
the scope of the theory. Even if something along these lines were correct (and I
register my scepticism), the point to be stressed is that its correctness is not to be
understood as flowing from the necessary meaning of such coordinate systems in
classical background-dependent physics.
Acknowledgements This material began to take something close to its current shape during a period
of sabbatical leave spent at UC San Diego. I thank the members of the UCSD philosophy department
for their generous welcome. I have benefitted from correspondence and/or discussions with John
Dougherty, Carl Hoefer, Dennis Lehmkuhl, Thomas Moller-Nielsen, Matt Pead, Brian Pitts, Carlo
Rovelli, Adán Sus, David Wallace and Chris Wüthrich. I have also received helpful comments from
numerous audience members at talks on related material, in Leeds, Konstanz, Oxford, Les Treilles,
Wuppertal, at the Second International Conference on the Ontology of Spacetime in Montreal, at
the Southern California Philosophy of Physics group, and at the Laboratoire SPHERE Philosophy
of Physics Seminar at Paris Diderot. Research related to this paper was supported during 2008–10
by a Philip Leverhulme Prize. Finally, special thanks are due to the editor for his encouragement,
and to Sam Fletcher and Neil Dewar for numerous comments on an earlier draft.
References
Anderson, J. L. (1964). Relativity principles and the role of coordinates in physics. In H.-y. Chiu and
W. F. Hoffmann (Eds.), Gravitation and Relativity, pp. 175–194. New York: W. A. Benjamin.
Anderson, J. L. (1967). Principles of Relativity Physics. New York: Academic Press.
Anderson, J. L. (1996). Answer to question 22. [“is there a gravitational force or not?,” Barbara
S. Andereck, am. j. phys. 63(7), 583 (1995)]. American Journal of Physics 64(5), 528–529.
Anderson, J. L. and R. Gautreau (1969). Operational formulation of the principle of equivalence.
Physical Review 185(5), 1656–1661.
Baez, J. C. (2000). What is a background-free theory?
Barbour, J. B. (1999). The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Our Understanding of the Universe.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Belot, G. (2007). The Representation of Time and Change in Mechanics. See Butterfield and
Earman (2007), pp. 133–227.
Belot, G. (2008). An elementary notion of gauge equivalence. General Relativity and Gravitation 40,
199–215.
Belot, G. (2011). Background-independence. General Relativity and Gravitation 43(1), 2865–2884.
Bergmann, P. G. (1942). An Introduction to the Theory of Relativity. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Brown, H. R. (2005). Physical Relativity: Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, H. R. and D. Lehmkuhl (2013). Einstein, the reality of space, and the action-reaction
principle. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9792.
Brown, H. R. and O. Pooley (2006). Minkowski space-time: A glorious non-entity. See Dieks
(2006), pp. 67–88.
Butterfield, J. N. and J. Earman (Eds.) (2007). Philosophy of Physics (1 ed.), Volume 2 of Handbook
of the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Dieks, D. (Ed.) (2006). The Ontology of Spacetime, Volume 1 of Philosophy and Foundations of
Physics. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Dirac, P. A. M. (2001 [1964]). Lectures on Quantum Mechanics. New York: Dover Publications,
Inc.
Background Independence 37
Earman, J. (1989). World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute versus Relational Theories of Space
and Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Earman, J. (2002). Response by John Earman. Philosophers’ Imprint 2, 19–23.
Earman, J. (2003). The cosmological constant, the fate of the universe, unimodular gravity, and all
that. Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34(4), 559–577.
Earman, J. (2006a). The implications of general covariance for the ontology and ideology of
spacetime. See Dieks (2006), pp. 3–24.
Earman, J. (2006b). Two challenges to the requirement of substantive general covariance. Syn-
these 148(2), 443–468.
Earman, J. and J. D. Norton (1987). What price spacetime substantivalism? the hole story. The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38, 515–525.
Einstein, A. (1905). Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper. Annalen der Physik 322(1), 891–921.
Reprinted in Einstein et al. (1952, 37–65).
Einstein, A. (1916). The foundation of the general theory of relativity. Annalen der Physik 49,
769–822. Reprinted in Einstein et al. (1952, 109–64).
Einstein, A. (1918). Prinzipielles zur allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie. Annalen der Physik 360,
241–244.
Einstein, A. (1920). Antwort auf Ernst Reichenbächer, “Inwiefern läßt sich die moderne Gravitation-
stheorie ohne die Relativität begründen?”. Die Naturwissenschaften 8, 1010–1011. Reprinted
in (Einstein, 2002, Doc. 49); pages references are to the accompanying translation volume.
Einstein, A. (1922). The Meaning of Relativity: Four Lectures Delivered at Princeton University,
May, 1921. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Einstein, A. (1924). Über den äther. Schweizerische naturforschende Gesellschaft, Verhanflun-
gen 105, 85–93. Translated by S. W. Saunders in (Saunders and Brown, 1991, 13–20); page
references are to this translation.
Einstein, A. (2002). The Berlin Years: Writings 1918-1921, Volume 7 of The Collected Papers of
Albert Einstein. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Einstein, A., H. A. Lorentz, H. Weyl, and H. Minkowski (1952). The Principle of Relativity: A
Collection of Original Papers on the Special and General Theory of Relativity. New York: Dover.
Translated by W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffrey.
Fletcher, S. C. (2013). Light Clocks and the Clock Hypothesis. Foundations of Physics 43(11),
1369–1383.
Friedman, M. (1983). Foundations of Space-Time Theories: Relativistic Physics and Philosophy of
Science. Princeton University Press.
Gaul,M. and C. Rovelli (2000). Loop quantum gravity and themeaning of diffeomorphism invariance.
In J. Kowalski-Glikman (Ed.), Towards Quantum Gravity: Proceeding of the XXXV International
Winter School on Theoretical Physics Held in Polanica, Poland, 2–11 February 1999, Volume
541 of Lecture Notes in Physics, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 277–324. Springer.
Giulini, D. (2007). Remarks on the notions of general covariance and background independence.
In I.-O. Stamatescu and E. Seiler (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Physics, Volume 721, pp. 105–120.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
Gryb, S. B. (2010). A definition of background independence. Classical and Quantum Gravity 27(2),
5018.
Hoffmann, B. (Ed.) (1966). Perspectives in Geometry and Relativity: Essays in Honor of Václav
Hlavatý. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Janssen, M. (2012). The twins and the bucket: How Einstein made gravity rather than motion relative
in general relativity. Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43(3), 159–175.
Knox, E. (2014). Newtonian spacetime structure in light of the equivalence principle. The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65, 863–880.
Kretschmann, E. (1917). Über den physikalischen Sinn der Relativitätspostulate. Annalen der
Physik 53, 575–614.
Lee, J. and R. M. Wald (1990). Local symmetries and constraints. Journal of Mathematical
Physics 31(3), 725–743.
38 O. Pooley
Misner, C., K. S. Thorne, and J. A. Wheeler (1973). Gravitation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman
and Company.
Norton, J. D. (1989). Coordinates and covariance: Einstein’s view of space-time and the modern
view. Foundations of Physics 19(1), 1215–1263.
Norton, J. D. (1993). General covariance and the foundations of general relativity: Eight decades of
dispute. Reports on Progress in Physics 56(7), 791–858.
Ohanian, H. C. and R. Ruffini (2013). Gravitation and Spacetime (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Pitts, J. B. (2006). Absolute objects and counterexamples: Jones–Geroch dust, Torretti constant
curvature, tetrad-spinor, and scalar density. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics 37(2), 347–371.
Pitts, J. B. (2009). Empirical equivalence, artificial gauge freedom and a generalized Kretschmann
objection. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4995/.
Pooley, O. (2010). Substantive general covariance: Another decade of dispute. In M. Suárez,
M. Dorato, and M. Rédei (Eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences: Launch of the
European Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2, pp. 197–209. Dordrecht: Springer.
Pooley, O. (2013). Substantivalist and relationalist approaches to spacetime. In R. W. Batterman
(Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics, pp. 522–586. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Rickles, D. (2008). Who’s afraid of background independence? In D. Dieks (Ed.), The Ontology of
Spacetime II, Volume 4 of Philosophy and Foundations of Physics, pp. 133–152. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Rosen, N. (1966). Flat space and variational principle. See Hoffmann (1966), Chapter 33, pp.
325–327.
Rovelli, C. (1997). Halfway through the woods: Contemporary research on space and time. In
J. Earman and J. D. Norton (Eds.), The Cosmos of Science: Essays of Exploration, Volume 6 of
Pittsburgh–Konstanz series in the philosophy and history of science, pp. 180–223. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Rovelli, C. (2001). Quantum spacetime: What do we know? In C. Callender and N. Huggett (Eds.),
Physics meets philosophy at the Planck scale: Contempory theories in quantum gravity, pp.
101–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rovelli, C. (2004). Quantum Gravity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rovelli, C. (2007). Quantum gravity. See Butterfield and Earman (2007), pp. 1287–1329.
Rozali, M. (2009). Comments on background independence and gauge redundancies. Advanced
Science Letters 2(2), 244–250.
Saunders, S. W. and H. R. Brown (Eds.) (1991). The Philosophy of the Vacuum. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Smolin, L. (2003). Time, structure and evolution in cosmology. In A. Ashtekar, R. S. Cohen,
D. Howard, J. Renn, S. Sarkar, and A. Shimony (Eds.), Revisiting the Foundations of Relativistic
Physics: Festschrift in Honor of John Stachel, Volume 234 of Boston Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, pp. 221–274. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Smolin, L. (2006). The case for background independence. In D. Rickles, S. French, and J. Saatsi
(Eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, Chapter 7, pp. 196–239. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Sorkin, R. D. (2002). An example relevant to the Kretschmann–Einstein debate. Modern Physics
Letters A 17(11), 695–700.
Stachel, J. (1993). The meaning of general covariance. In J. Earman, A. I. Janis, G. J. Massey, and
N. Rescher (Eds.), Philosophical problems of the internal and external worlds: essays on the
philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum, Volume 1 of Pittsburgh–Konstanz series in the philosophy and
history of science, pp. 129–160. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Sus, A. (2008). General Relativity and the Physical Content of General Covariance. Ph. D. thesis,
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.
Background Independence 39
Sus, A. (2010). Absolute objects and general relativity: Dynamical considerations. In M. Suarez,
M. Dorato, and M. Rédei (Eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences: Launch of the
European Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2, Chapter 23, pp. 239–249. Springer.
Synge, J. L. (1960). Relativity: The General Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Torretti, R. (1984). Space-time physics and the philosophy of science. The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 35(3), 280–292.
Trautman, A. (1966). Comparison of Newtonian and relativistic theories of space-time. See
Hoffmann (1966), Chapter 42, pp. 413–425.
Varadarajan, M. (2007). Dirac quantization of parametrized field theory. Physical Review D 75(4),
44018.
Westman, H. F. and S. Sonego (2009). Coordinates, observables and symmetry in relativity. Annals
of Physics 324(8), 1585–1611.
